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Summary
Unlike traditional networks, DTNs are characterized by intermittent connec-
tivity. Nodes may experience frequent disconnections and long communication
delay in DTNs. While there are existing works that focus on improving the
performance of DTN, they do not look into how it may benet or improve the
applications running on the DTN. With the unique characteristic of DTN, we
believe that it is benecial to the applications if the DTN protocols are designed
with application in mind.
In this dissertation, we design protocols to better manage resources in the
DTN. We show how routing can be improved when the routing protocol is
application-aware. In addition, we consider the resource management for a class
of applications in which nodes perform cooperative tasks apart from merely re-
laying messages. Finally, we look at the security implications that aect the
resource usage in the DTN.
In our rst work, we look into application-aware routing in DTN. We show
that in the face of inherent intermittent connectivity, knowledge of application
semantics can be exploited in routing to improve application performance in the
network. We then propose a mechanism to capture application semantics based
on dependency relationships. The mechanism is general and can be used to model
a large class of applications. We show how to incorporate dependency relation-
ship into existing DTN routing algorithms to enhance application performance.
Specically, our approach allows a relay node to prioritize the sending/buering
v
vi
of messages with the goal of optimizing the completion of application tasks.
In our second work, we consider resource management in a class of applica-
tions in which nodes in the DTN participate in completing application-related
tasks in the system. We assume that tasks may appear dynamically in the sys-
tem without a priori knowledge. As a result, it is not possible to pre-plan the
task allocation to nodes in the system. We look at a possible real life taxi sce-
nario that falls into the described class of applications and proposed the Taxi
Advisory Dispatch System (TADS). TADS is a distributed taxi advisory system
in which taxis collaboratively monitor and advise some free taxis to move to
regions with higher ratio of clients. We perform evaluation of TADS based on
traces obtained from a large Singapore taxi company that operates more than
15,000 taxis. Our results show that TADS can reduce the number of clients with
wait times longer than 60 minutes by over 30%.
Finally, we look at the routing security issues that aect the resource us-
age in the DTN. In particular, we revisit the Haggle and DieselNet DTNs that
Burgess et al. [1] have previously reported that both DTNs (with no authentica-
tion mechanisms) are robust against even a large number of attackers. We show
how techniques that are employed by many routing protocols to improve resource
usage can be exploited by attackers. Specically, we demonstrate how to exploit
routing metadata to improve the eectiveness of attacks and we identify scenar-
ios where DTNs are most vulnerable to such attacks. In addition, we show how
attackers can increase the eectiveness of their attacks in our application-aware
routing protocols via manipulation of dependency relationships. Finally, we give
a discussion on the level of authentication that is required to secure the attacks
that we presented.
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Recent advancement in technology created a trend in which many low power,
small portable devices are carried by humans as well as embedded in the envi-
ronment as smart devices. A typical example is cellphones, which are carried by
billions of users in the world for communication purposes. Unlike the early gen-
eration of cellphones, newer cellphones (such as smartphones) are often equipped
with some short range wireless communication capability such as Bluetooth and
WiFi.
While these devices may communicate over the cellular network, the use of
such short range communication over the ISM band does have its advantages.
First, communication over short range wireless network (eg. Bluetooth, ZigBee)
can reduce energy consumption by up to 90% over cellular wireless networks (e.g.
3G networks) [2]. This may be a major consideration for power constrained mo-
bile devices. Second, if the devices are in close communication range, these short
range communication links often provides higher bandwidth than cellular wire-
less networks. Third, the use of short range communication links over the ISM
band is much less costly to deploy as there is neither infrastructure nor subscrip-
tion cost. Finally, cellular network service may not be available, especially in
1
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rural areas or underground tunnels etc.
With a large number of short range wireless equipped portable devices being
carried by humans or vehicles, these devices can potentially form a network for
communication and information sharing purposes. Use of short range radios,
coupled with mobility and energy saving mechanisms that turn o the network
interface opportunistically lead to intermittent connectivity and the formation
of a Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN). A DTN is characterized by
the lack of a contemporaneous path between the source and destination at any
given time. DTN connectivities are typically intermittent, and it may experience
frequent, long duration partitioning.
Due to intermittent connectivity and diculty in establishing an 'instanta-
neous' end-to-end route, traditional internet routing protocols and ad hoc routing
protocols such DSR [3] and AODV [4] do not work well in DTN. In DTN, rout-
ing is typically opportunistic. Nodes do not pre-establish a routing path before
data transfer. Rather, data are transferred in a store-and-forward manner from
node to node whenever the link between two nodes is up. In the DTN literature,
this is known as a contact. The amount of data that can be transferred during a
contact opportunity is known as the contact capacity. The frequency of contacts,
the contact capacity, and the buer space (storage) available at each node are
important factors that aect the routing performance of the DTN.
Applications that run on a DTN are typically non-real-time and are tolerable
to various degrees of communication delays. Example of some possible famil-
iar applications include email, le sharing/transfer applications, twitter-like or
micro-blogging applications, social networking applications such as \who's near
me", rss feeds, and etc.
In addition, there are also more specialized applications in which the DTN
is formed mainly for the purpose of supporting the particular application. Such
applications may involve nodes given some tasks to perform in the system. For
example, consider a Search and Rescue operation. In this case, the agents (nodes)
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come together (forming a DTN) solely for the purpose of rescuing the victims.
Another possible example is distributed taxi booking system [5] [6]. In a
distributed taxi booking system, each taxi (node) is equipped with a short range
communication device such as WiFi. A client uses a WiFi device to communicate
with a taxi in wireless communication range. If the taxi is busy, it communicates
with other taxis in the DTN to locate a free taxi in vicinity. The free taxi will
then move to the client location to pick up the client.
Regardless of the kind of applications and their tolerance to delay, appli-
cations can generally still benet from a better performance of the DTN. It is
hence important to manage the resources in the DTN eectively to improve the
application performance.
1.2 Application-Aware Protocols and Resource Man-
agement in DTNs
In this thesis, we focus on enhancing application performance through the better
management of resources in the DTN.
For DTN routing, the important resources include the contact capacity and
buer size of the nodes in the network. We believe that if routing algorithms
take into consideration of the application semantics, then the resources can be
better utilized to improve the application performance.
For example, consider a le sharing application. All data blocks of a sin-
gle le must be received by the destination for the le transfer to be deemed
successful. However, due to intermittent connectivity in DTN, dierent data
blocks of the le might be split, drop, and transferred by dierent relay nodes
to the destination. When relay nodes are aware that all data blocks of the le
must be successfully transferred before it is considered successful, the missing
components of ongoing le transfers can be assigned with higher priorities to
increase the number of successful le transfer. For example, it is much better
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that 50% of le downloads completes successfully (ie. with 100% of the blocks
received in each le transfer), as compared to the case whereby 100% of le
downloads receive 50% of their individual data blocks - resulting in no successful
le downloads at all. Existing routing protocols are optimized to deliver as many
data blocks as possible, but do not take into consideration of the fact that a le
transfer application requires all data blocks of the le to be received before it is
considered successful.
The above consider the role of the nodes in the DTN as simply sending/relaying
messages. However, nodes can perform cooperative tasks apart from merely re-
laying messages. Consider a class of applications in which nodes in the DTN
participate in completing application-related tasks in the system. We assume
that the system consists of an unknown number of tasks and the tasks may ap-
pear dynamically in the system without a priori knowledge. As a result, it is
not possible to pre-plan the task allocation to nodes in the system. In addition,
we assume that each node can only process one task at any single point of time
and tasks can be allocated/distributed to other nodes in the form of request
messages. Nodes in the DTN collaboratively try to allocate the tasks in the
system with an objective in mind (such as minimizing average task completion
delay, minimizing the maximum task completion delay etc). However, due to
time constraints, nodes may only gather partial knowledge of the system before
a decision has to be made.
As an example, consider a distributed taxi booking system. A taxi (node)
would pick up a client and sends the client to his/her destination. Picking up
a client and sending the client to his/her destination is considered as a task in
the system. Taxis may choose to collaboratively pickup clients such that the
maximum waiting times of clients can be minimized. Key challenges of such a
system design will be: (i) how to quickly inform other taxis on the locations of
known clients, and (ii) how the taxis can collaboratively determine the client
that each taxi is supposed to pick up to avoid dispatching more than one taxi to
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the same client.
1.3 Research Goals and Contributions
The main objective of our research work is to enhance application performance
through better resource management in the DTN. In addition, we also look at
the security implications that aect the resource usage in DTN.
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. Application-Aware routing protocols for DTN.
In this work, we show that in the face of inherent intermittent connec-
tivity, knowledge of application semantics can be exploited in routing to
improve application performance in the network. To enable DTN routing
algorithms to take into consideration application semantics, we proposed
a mechanism to capture application semantics based on dependency rela-
tionships. The mechanism is general and can be used to model a large
class of applications.
We show that for many applications, data do inherently have some form of
dependency relationships. For example, web pages and related multime-
dia objects reference each other using hyperlinks. Media le formats such
as MPEG have the I-P-B frame structure for compression/decompression.
Even normal data les have dependencies in which all data blocks of a
le are required for a le transfer to be considered successful. Such data
dependency can be algorithmically be extracted and use in routing algo-
rithms.
With dependency relationships extracted, we show how dependency re-
lationships can be incorporated into existing DTN routing algorithms to
enhance application performance. Specically, it allows a relay node to
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prioritize the sending/buering of data blocks with the goal of optimizing
the completion of application tasks (eg. a le transfer).
We perform evaluation using simulation on two real life traces and the
simulation results show that when application semantics are exploited, we
can substantially improve application performance from 60% to 583% over
the baseline DTN routing algorithms.
2. Application Resource Management in DTN
In this work, we consider resource management in a class of applications
in which nodes in the DTN participate in completing application-related
tasks in the system. We assume that the system consists of an unknown
number of tasks and the tasks may appear dynamically in the system with-
out a priori knowledge. As a result, it is not possible to pre-plan the task
allocation to nodes in the system. In addition, we assume that each node
can only process a task at any single point of time and tasks can be allo-
cated/distributed to other nodes in the form of request messages. Nodes
in the DTN collaboratively try to allocate the tasks in the system with an
objective in mind (such as minimizing average task completion delay, min-
imizing the maximum task completion delay etc). Due to time constraints
and communication delay, nodes may only gather partial knowledge of the
system before a decision has to be made.
There are many possible applications that falls into the above considered
model (eg. search and rescue, distributed taxi booking system and etc).
In this work, we work on a realistic example of such an application that we
called the Taxi Advisory Dispatch System (TADS). TADS is a distributed
taxi advisory system in which advisory tokens are sent to advise free taxis
to move to regions that have a higher number of clients. Taxis would then
have a higher chance of picking up clients. A task in TADS involves a taxi
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picking up the client and sending the client to its intended destination.
The objective of TADS is to reduce the long waiting times of clients. Taxis
(nodes) in TADS are assumed to be equipped with a location-aware device
(eg. GPS) and a short range wireless communication device (eg. WiFi).
TADS runs on DTN and is particularly challenging to design because taxis
have limited communication opportunity. Due to limited communication
and delay, each taxi would only have partial knowledge (eg. number of free
taxis and clients in a region) about the system. In addition, information
received from other taxis may be outdated quickly as taxis may move and
change their status quickly. Clients may also be picked up by other taxis
and communication delay may hinder such information from being made
known to other taxis.
Our solution involves heuristics in which taxis collaboratively monitor to
determine the number of free taxis and clients in each region over a period
of time. At the end of each monitoring period, an elected leader taxi for
each region determines if it is necessary to request for more taxis to move
into its region. For regions that require more taxis, advisory tokens are
generated (by their respective region leader) and forwarded to taxis in
nearby regions. When a taxi receives the token, it moves to the requested
region if it locally determines that moving to the requested region will
improve the objective.
We perform evaluation of TADS based on traces obtained from a large
Singapore taxi company that operates more than 15,000 taxis. Our results
show that TADS can reduce the number of clients with wait times longer
than 60 minutes by over 30%.
3. Robustness of DTN against attacks.
Routing attacks misuse resources in the DTN and may cause severe per-
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formance degradation. In this work, we evaluate the robustness of DTN
against attacks.
Due to diculty of key management in DTN, some authors have looked
into the possibility of forgoing authentication [1] [7]. Burgess et al. work [1]
has suggested that some DTNs coupled with replication-based routing pro-
tocols are intrinsically fault tolerant, and robust against a large number of
attackers even in the absence of authentication [1]. This poses the question
on the necessity of authentication or the level of authentication required
especially since authentication imposes overhead. Without authentication,
it may encourage more nodes to join the network (providing more resources
such as buer storage) due to simplicity of joining.
First, we revisit the Haggle and DieselNet DTNs that Burgess et al. [1] have
previously reported that both the DTNs (with no authentication mecha-
nisms) are robust against even a large number of attackers.
We investigate two routing techniques that have been popularly used to
improve resources in DTN routing. One technique is the contact history
that is used in many DTN routing protocols [8] [9] [10]. These DTN routing
protcols often ood their contact history into the network so that relay
nodes can better allocate their resources to packets that are deemed to have
a higher chance of delivery. Another technique is the network-wide packet
delivery acknowledgement that is used to prevent copies of a delivered
message from further replication [9] [10].
Using techniques that exploit the contact histories, we devised an attack
called non-deliverable ooding attack. Non-deliverable ooding attack
oods non-deliverable packets into the network. It also falsied contact
history in an attempt to make the non-deliverable packets to be given
higher priority for replication and buering in the network. This causes
severe resource contention in the network. In addition, we introduce an-
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other attack called identity impersonation that exploits the lack of identity
authentication and packet delivery acknowledgements. Identity imperson-
ation attack causes relay and source nodes to drop packets that have not
been delivered. We show the eectiveness of our attacks and we identify
scenarios where DTNs are most vulnerable to such attacks.
Finally, we study how attackers can attack our application-aware rout-
ing protocols. Our application-aware routing protocols ood dependency
graphs as routing metadata into the network so that relay nodes can de-
termine the packets which are more crucial to complete application tasks.
This however, may also give attackers the chance to exploit the dependency
graphs in their attacks. We show how attackers can increase the eective-
ness of attack through the manipulation of dependency relationships.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses back-
ground and related work. It also discusses various security and possible attacks
on a DTN. In Chapter 3, we present our application-aware routing protocols.
Chapter 4 describes our proposed Taxi Advisory Dispatch System (TADS) and
chapter 5 describes our work on the robustness of DTN against routing attacks.
We conclude our work in Chapter 6 with directions for future research.
Chapter 2
Background
DTNs are a class of emerging networks that are characterized by intermittent
connectivity. Such networks are often assumed to experience frequent, long-
duration partitioning and may never have an end-to-end contemporaneous path.
In this chapter, we rst give a short discussion on some possible applications
in DTN. We then describe some terminologies and popular performance metrics
that are frequently used in the context of DTN. Next, we provide a survey on
some general strategies to improve performance in DTN. In addition, we discuss
in more detail some popular routing algorithms. Finally, we look at routing
security issues related to DTN.
2.1 DTN Applications
Applications that run on a DTN are typically non real-time and are tolerable
to various degree of communication delays. Example of some possible famil-
iar applications include email, le sharing/transfer applications, twitter-like or
micro-blogging applications, social networking applications such as "who's near
me", rss feeds, and etc.
In addition, there are also more specialized applications in which the DTN is
formed mainly for the purpose of supporting an application. Such applications
10
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 11
typically involve nodes given some tasks to perform in the system. For example,
in Search and Rescue operations, humans and even robots [11] [12] may come
together with the purpose of searching and rescuing victims.
In participatory sensing applications, the applications involve using everyday
mobile devices, such as cellular phones, to form participatory sensor networks
to gather information [13] [14] [15] [16]. Each sensing devices are tasked to col-
lect information and the sensed data may be relayed through the DTN network.
For example, in GreenGPS [15], participatory sensing data collected by indi-
viduals from their vehicles are consolidated into a system that predicts the fuel
consumption of an arbitrary car on an arbitrary street. In ParkNet [16], vehi-
cles are tasked to collect parking space occupancy information while driving by.
The collected information in ParkNet can actually be similarly routed to nearby
vehicles using a DTN.
In a distributed taxi booking system [5] [6], clients use short range communi-
cation devices such as WiFi to communicate with taxis in communication range.
Due to mobility of the taxis, communication between nodes (clients and taxis) is
intermittent, forming a DTN. Client booking requests are forwarded to nearby
free taxis through the DTN. Taxi nodes in the booking system are tasked to
pickup and send their clients to their destination.
2.2 DTN Terminologies
Message. A message (or bundle) is a protocol data unit for data transfer in
DTN. In this dissertation, we shall use the term message, bundle, packet and
data block interchangeably.
Contact. When a link between two nodes is up, they exchange data with one
another. This connection opportunity is referred to as a contact in the DTN
literature [17].
Contact Duration. Contact duration is the time duration that the contact
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 12
lasted. The time duration between two contacts of a pair of nodes is known as
the inter-contact duration.
Contact Capacity. Contact capacity depicts how much data can be exchanged
when two nodes are in contact. A contact duration that is longer will tend to
have a higher contact capacity (assuming other factors like interference being
equal). Knowing the contact schedule and contact capacity allows DTN routing
protocols to better schedule messages for transmission on certain paths.
Buer Space (Storage). Due to unavailability of an end-to-end connectiv-
ity, DTN routing protocols adopt a store-and-forward approach. Messages are
stored at relay nodes and forwarded/replicated to the next hop when they are
in communication range. Messages may be buered for a long period of time
since disconnection period may be long. In the event of buer contention, buer
management policy such as FIFO or other more complex strategies are used to
drop messages.
2.2.1 Routing performance metrics in DTNs
The popular routing performance metrics that are used in the DTN literature
are delivery ratio, latency, and transmission overhead.
Delivery ratio is dened as the fraction of generated messages that are deliv-
ered to the nal destination within a given period of time.
Another frequently used metric is latency. It is the time a message is gen-
erated at the source to the time the message is delivered to the destination.
While DTNs can generally tolerate delay, many applications can still benet
from shorter delivery latency.
Finally, transmission overhead is the amount of contact capacity consumed
by a protocol to deliver a message. Replication-based routing strategies typically
transmit more copies of the same message than forward-based routing strategies.
Transmission overhead can also be dierent because routing strategies make
dierent decisions about the next hop or routing path.
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2.3 General Performance Improvement Strategies
In the literature, a number of performance improvement strategies have been
used to improve the performance of DTN. They can be broadly classied into
the following categories.
2.3.1 Adding more nodes
The most straightforward approach is to introduce more nodes into the sparse
network. If additional nodes are introduced at dierent parts of the network,
they provide more contact opportunity, capacity and buer space for the net-
work. In [18] [19], additional nodes in the form of throwboxes are added to the
DTN to enhance performance. Throwboxes are stationary wireless devices with
storage that acts as a relay, creating contact opportunity where none existed
before. Another way to have more nodes in the network is to encourage more
nodes to join the network by making it easier for them to join. Burgess et al.
have suggested to forgo authentication (hence no administrative diculty and
overhead) to encourage more volunteer nodes into publicly deployed DTNs [1].
Using a number of possible attacks, the authors show that some DTNs cou-
pled with replication-based routing protocols are intrinsically fault tolerant and
robust against a large number of malicious nodes. In such DTNs, it may be
possible to forgo authentication to encourage more nodes into the network.
2.3.2 Replication
DTN routing protocols can be broadly classied into forward-based or replication-
based. In the forward-based approach, only a single copy of message is main-
tained in the network [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] while the replication-based approach
replicates a message at many dierent nodes [25] [8] [26] [9] [10]. Replication is
useful when nodes are unreliable, or when contact schedules are unpredictable.
In such cases, replicating messages increases the chance of delivery and also re-
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duces latency. The main idea of replication is to have many copies of the same
message in the network to increase the probability that one of them will nd
its way to the destination. This also leads to a shorter delivery latency for the
message.
The downside of replication is however the higher cost incurred in terms of
transmission overhead and buer space usage. Some routing protocols such as
Spray and Wait [26], Spray and Focus [27] etc sets a predened limit on the
number of replications allowed per message to reduce cost. Others use various
knowledge such as delivery predictability, acknowledgements, to limit or prevent
further replication of messages [8] [28] [9] [10]. Some have explored the use of
erasure and network coding schemes [29] [30] in an attempt to keep the benet
of replication while minimizing resource usage.
2.3.3 Knowledge
Embedding additional information and propagating them into the network has
been shown to be benecial to the performance of the DTN. Such information is
often propagated as routing metadata. Although metadata takes up additional
bandwidth, it however allows nodes in the network to be better informed and
make better decision for forwarding and management of buer space. The follow-
ing paragraphs describe three common types of information that are propagated
in the network to improve delivery performance.
The following describes 3 common types of information that are propagated
into the network to improve performance.
Contact History
Depending on the network scenario, dierent levels of information may be avail-
able to the nodes. An example is the contact information. On one extreme
end, all contact schedules are known beforehand; hence a routing protocol can
compute the lowest delivery latency path to the destination. If nodes are also
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reliable, such scenario negates the need to replicate messages as the most feasible
path can be pre-computed and messages can be sent along the path reliably. On
the other end is the scenario whereby there is no information about contacts in
advance. Many routing protocols have been developed to address this scenario.
The main strategy taken is to predict the future contacts based on past contact
history [20] [31] [32] [8] [9] [10] [33]. In MaxProp [9], previous contact history is
converted into meeting probabilities. These meeting probabilities are then used
to estimate the delivery cost of a message to certain destination. In Rapid [10],
each node keeps track of the average inter-contact duration and contact capacity
of another peer based on previous observations.
The knowledge of these information allows a node to determine how likely
it is able to deliver a message to its destination. Priority is usually given to
messages that a node has higher chances of delivering. In order to provide
estimation of delivering messages in multiple hops, such routing information is
usually propagated to all the nodes in the network.
Acknowledgements
Besides information about contacts, information about delivery status of mes-
sages can also help to improve performance. In [9], the use of network-wide
acknowledgements to inform all other nodes about the delivery of a message has
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Recipient List
In [10], information about the nodes (source and relay nodes) having a copy
of a message is propagated to other nodes. This allows nodes in the network
to know who is holding a copy of the message and estimate the likelihood and
latency that a message is going to be delivered. The estimated values are used
for computing utility values which allow messages to be sorted for replication
decision during a contact or for dropping when buer is full. [10] shows that
using recipient list can help to improve performance.
2.3.4 Buer Management
Buer management is important when using replication-based DTN routing pro-
tocols. Due to message replication, buer tends to be lled quickly and dropping
policies have direct impacts on the delivery performance of the routing protocols.
Early DTN routing protocols manage nite buer by using FIFO queues [25] or
Drop Least Encountered (DLE) approach [34] [32] [8] [35]. Later works use
delivery probability [9] or utility value [10] to decide on the messages to drop.
In general, routing algorithms in DTN favours messages that can be delivered
quickly.
2.3.5 Mobility
In [36] [37], the authors have shown that mobility can increase the capacity of
mobile ad hoc networks or DTNs. To further enhance performance, nodes may
actively move in response to communication needs [32] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43]
[44] [45] [46] [47].
In [38], when a network is partitioned and a node is unable to send a message
to a destination, the node will compute a shortest time strategy (including nodes
mobility as part of the strategy) to deliver the message assuming that other nodes
location are known and is willing to move to relay message.
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In [39], message ferries are controlled to move in a Levy walk pattern to
maximize the opportunity of meeting the destinations. Levy walks are known to
show optimal searching eciency for sparse and randomly distributed targets.
In [41], two message ferry schemes are proposed - Node Initiated Message
Ferry (NIMF) and Ferry Initiated Message Ferry (FIMF). In NIMF, ferries
move around the deployed area according to known routes. With knowledge
of ferry routes, nodes periodically move close to a ferry and communicate with
the ferry. In FIMF, ferries move proactively to meet nodes. When a node wants
to send/receive messages to/from other nodes, it generates a service request to
a chosen ferry using a long range radio. Upon reception of a service request,
the ferry will move to meet up with the node and exchange packets using short
range radio.
In [32], additional participants (autonomous agents) are introduced to aug-
ment the performance of DTN routing. Nodes in the network ood their status
(bandwidth, latency etc.) so that the autonomous agents know about the global
state of the network. Autonomous agents can then adapt their movements in
response to variations in network demand to optimize for one or more metrics
(eg. average delivery time).
2.4 Popular DTN routing protocols
In the forward-based routing protocols [20] [21] [22] [23] [24], message is passed
from one node to the other until it reaches the destination. Forward-based
routing protocols are more suitable in situations where nodes are reliable and
contact schedules are a priori or highly predictable. For DTNs without known
contact schedules, routing protocols typically use the replication-based approach.
In this dissertation, we look at the case whereby contact schedules are not
known a priori. We discuss some popular replication-based routing protocols as
follows.
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2.4.1 Epidemic
Epidemic routing protocol [48] replicates messages to all contactable nodes in the
network. The protocol uses signicant resources (contact capacity and storage)
due to replication. However, as long as the load does not stress the available
resources, Epidemic gives the best performance in terms of delivery ratio and
latency.
2.4.2 Spray And Wait
Spray andWait [26] is a replication-based routing protocol that limits the number
of copies of each message in the network. It consists of two phases: Spray phase
and the Wait phase.
In the Spray phase, for each message originating from a source node, L
message copies are initially forwarded by the source and relay nodes. If the
destination is not found in the Spray phase, then at the Wait phase, nodes
carrying a message copy will only perform a direct transmission (ie. forward the
message only to its destination).
Multiple variants of spray phase are possible. In particular, the Binary Spray
and Wait scheme has been proven to have the minimum expected delay among
all variants of Spray and Wait routing protocols when nodes movement is IID.
In the Binary Spray and Wait scheme, the source node initially starts with L
copies of the message. When node i that has n > 1 message copies (source or
relay) encounter another node j (with no copies), it forwards to node j bn=2c
and keeps dn=2e for itself. When a node is left with only one copy, it switches
to direct transmission.
2.4.3 Prophet
Prophet uses a probabilistic metric called delivery predictability for routing.
Initially, when node i meets node j, the delivery predictability pij is updated
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to be:
p0ij = pij + (1  pij) p0
where p0 is an initialization constant.
When node i does not meet node j for some time, Prophet decreases the
delivery predictability using
p0ij = pij  t
where  2 [0; 1) is an aging constant, and t is the number of time units that
have elapsed since the last time the metric was aged.
In addition, when node i receives delivery predictabilities from node j, node
i may compute the transitive delivery predictability to node k using
p0ik = pik + (1  pik) pij  pjk  
where  is a scaling constant that decides how large the impact of transitivity
should have on delivery predictability.
In Prophet, a message is replicated to the other node if the delivery pre-
dictability of the destination of the message is higher at the other node.
2.4.4 MaxProp
MaxProp is a popular replication-based routing protocol that has been shown to
achieve better throughput than several other strategies such as Epidemic, Spray
and Wait and Prophet [9].
MaxProp uses additional knowledge of contact history and message delivery
status (acknowledgements) to better utilize resources. When two nodes meet,
MaxProp replicates messages in the following order:
1. Messages destined to the contacted node.
2. Routing metadata (estimations of the probability of meeting every other
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node)
3. Acknowledgements of delivered data
4. Messages in ascending order of hop count for hop count below a certain
threshold. This threshold is adaptive and is determined by using the av-
erage contact capacity measured from previous encounters.
5. Messages in descending order of delivery likelihood
When a node needs to make space for buer, MaxProp removes messages
from its buer in the following order:
1. Acknowledged messages
2. Messages in ascending order of delivery likelihood for messages with hop
count above a certain adaptive threshold
3. Messages in descending order of message hop count
In contrast to Prophet which replicates a message only if the other node has
higher delivery predictability to deliver the message to the destination, MaxProp
always replicates all messages (except for those that the other node already has)
as long as the contact capacity allows. To reduce resource usage, MaxProp
sends network-wide acknowledgements for messages that have been delivered so
that source and relay nodes can stop further replication and remove delivered
messages from their buer.
2.4.5 Rapid
Rapid [10] is a utility driven routing protocol that assigns a utility value for each
message to determine the priority for replication and buer management. When
node i encounter j, the following steps are performed:
1. Initialization: Receive metadata from Y
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2. Direct Delivery : Send messages destined to Y in decreasing order of utility
3. Replication: For each message that is not in node Y, compute the marginal
utility of replicating the message to Y. Replicate the messages in descend-
ing order of marginal utility normalized by message size.
Similar to MaxProp, Rapid always replicates all messages as long as the
contact capacity allows (except for those that the other node already has). It
also uses network-wide acknowledgements for messages that have been delivered.
In addition, Rapid keeps track of the nodes holding a copy of each message so
that it can better estimate the expected delivery delay of messages. The expected
delivery delay is used as part of the utility computation of Rapid.
Rapid has been shown to perform extremely well, outperforming both Spray
and Wait and MaxProp [10]. It uses more information in its utility computation
compared to MaxProp.
2.5 DTN Routing Security
2.5.1 Key setup in DTNs
Till date, approaches for securing routing in DTN largely depends on using public
key cryptography to limit participants to a set of authorized nodes and using
class of service for the allocation of buering and link capacity [17] [49] [50] [51].
Public keys for verication can be pre-distributed before deployment, but
this approach is more dicult when incremental deployment of network nodes
is desirable. Alternatively, a public key infrastructure (PKI) may be used. The
use of traditional PKI however, is not suitable for disconnected environments
such as DTN, since access to online servers for fetching public keys and checking
Certicate Revocation Lists (CRL) cannot be assumed. As such, Identity Based
Cryptography (IBC) schemes have been proposed for use in DTN environments
[50] [51]. With IBC scheme, the recipient public key is simply a function of a
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public identication string of the recipient, hence the recipient identity implicitly
validate the recipient public key. As for CRL, Seth et al. propose to use a short
timeout period for signing keys (eg. a day) [50]. Signer is expected to get new
time-stamped private key from the PKG before the previous key timeout.
The use of cryptography to authenticate every single participants and mes-
sages in DTN can dramatically reduce the attack surface of the network. How-
ever, such schemes have high processing overhead and administrative or key
management diculty in certain environments, and hence may not always be
possible to implement [1].
2.5.2 Routing Attacks
While routing security has been studied extensively in traditional ad hoc net-
works [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57], the work cannot be easily extended to DTNs
due to dierent routing style and network characteristics. For example, route in
ad hoc networks are typically established before any data transfer. Routing dis-
ruption attacks such as black hole [52] [53], ood rushing [57] and wormhole [54]
attack the route establishment process. It either causes route establishment to
fail, or establishing a route that data will not be delivered to its destination. In
DTNs, routing are opportunistic and they typically do not pre-establish a route
before sending data.
In this section, we survey possible routing attacks on DTNs.
Blackhole/DropAll Attack
In this attack, attacker simply drops all the messages that it receives [52] [53]. In
forward-based DTN routing protocols, attackers may advertise themselves as the
most suitable relay to the destination so that messages are routed to the attackers
and then dropped. Since forward-based DTN routing protocols do not replicate
messages, the message will be lost and not be delivered to the destination. Using
replication-based routing protocols is a natural defence against drop all attacks.
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Route Metadata Falsication
Even though routing in DTN may be opportunistic, studies have shown that
the use of routing metadata such as expected meeting time or probability can
improve routing performance. Each node's routing metadata is propagated to
other nodes in the network so that every node will have a more global view of
the network. Unfortunately, an attacker may inject falsied routing metadata
into the network and cause performance degradation.
Routing metadata falsication attack has been studied extensively in ad-hoc
networks literature [52] [53] [54] [55] [56]. An example of routing attack in ad-
hoc networks includes creating a routing loop, so that packets traverse nodes in
a cycle without reaching their destination, thus consuming energy and available
bandwidth. Another example is the blackhole attack whereby nodes advertise
fake routing metadata to attract packets and then drop the packets.
For forward-based DTN routing protocols, attacks can advertise themselves
as the most suitable relays to the destinations so that packets can be forwarded
to them which they can launch blackhole attacks.
For replication-based DTN routing protocols, due to the availability of many
paths to destination, routing metadata falsication causes performance degrada-
tion in a dierent manner compared to ad hoc network or forward-based DTN
routing protocol.
Routing metadata falsication attack in replication-based routing protocols
works by causing messages to be replicated in the wrong order or even not
replicated at all. For example in Prophet [8], if the other node has a lower
delivery predictability than the destination, then current node will not replicate
the message to the other node. In addition, when there is buer contention, it
causes messages to be dropped in the wrong order. Hence when contact capacity
is low or when buer contention is high, routing metadata falsication can cause
severe performance degradation.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 24
Defence against routing metadata falsication in DTN includes getting every
node in the network to sign its routing metadata, and checking if metadata
claim is consistent. For example, if node A claims frequent meeting and message
exchanges with node B, but node B claims otherwise, further investigation might
be needed.
Acknowledgement Counterfeiting
For replication-based routing protocols in DTN, the use of network-wide ac-
knowledgements to inform all other nodes about the delivery of a message has
been shown to be very benecial to the routing performance. Acknowledgements
in [9] [10] is simply the 128-bits cryptographic hash of the content, source and
destination of each message. Unfortunately, this does not prevent attackers who
have seen the message from ooding fake acknowledgments into the network.
Fake acknowledgements causes relay nodes holding a copy of the acknowledged
message to be dropped and can cause severe degradation of performance.
A solution to this will be for the destination of messages to sign every ac-
knowledgement that it created. Relay nodes can hence verify the authenticity
of acknowledgements. However, the signature size itself incurs a large overhead.
Alternatively, Burgess et al have proposed to ignore and delete an acknowledge-
ment if a node has not previously seen the message that the acknowledgement is
acknowledging [1]. This leverage on the fact that messages should normally prop-
agate from nodes closest to a message's source to nodes closest to a message's
destination. Consequently, message acknowledgements should propagate in the
reverse direction. Burgess et al. show that this defence reduces the eectiveness
of acknowledgement counterfeiting in the MaxProp protocol [1].
Recipient List Attack
In [10], Aruna et al. show that replicating messages together with the list of
nodes holding a copy of the message can help to improve performance as nodes
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can better estimate on how likely the message is to be delivered soon. Unfor-
tunately, similar to acknowledgement counterfeiting, attackers who know about
the message can easily fake the list of nodes holding a copy of the message. Note
that even if the list is to be signed by each individual node itself, compromised
insider nodes sharing their keys can still sign and make it look as though there
are already many nodes holding a copy of the message. This may cause the
message to be regarded as being suciently replicated and hence dropped in the
event of a buer contention.
Resource Consumption Attack
Resources such as the contact capacity, buer space, and battery of mobile nodes
are limited. Due to replication of messages and metadata, performing a resource
consumption attack is easier in replication-based routing protocols than in tra-
ditional ad hoc network routing protocols.
Contact capacity is an important resource in sparse DTNs as links may be up
only for a short time and down for a long period of time. A simple way to drain
contact capacity is to ood new messages into the network. Replication-based
routing protocols will replicate the messages, draining up contact capacity and
buer space of nodes in the network. To counter this attack, admission control




In DTN, nodes typically do not pre-establish a routing path before data trans-
fer. Data are transferred in a store-and-forward manner from node to node
whenever the link between the two nodes is up. During a contact, data can
either be forwarded or replicated to the other node. In the forward-based ap-
proach, only a single copy of the message is maintained in the network [20]
[21] [22] [23]. Forward-based DTN routing algorithms usually assume a DTN
environment whereby nodes are reliable, and contact schedules are a priori or
highly predictable. When nodes are unreliable or contact schedules are not a
priori, replication-based routing algorithms are usually preferred. Replicating
messages in such cases increases the chance of delivery and also reduces la-
tency [25] [8] [26] [9] [10].
To further improve performance, existing routing algorithms exploit vari-
ous information such as contact history, acknowledgements, limiting number of
copies in the network, and even list of nodes having a copy of a message [8] [26]
[9] [10]. In [58] [59], exploitation of mobility patterns based on social network
context is applied. Nodes that are in the same communities or more popular are
identied so as to improve delivery probability.
While the above mentioned routing algorithms exploit various additional in-
formation to improve routing performance, none of these routing algorithms are
26
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designed to exploit application semantics to enhance routing. Existing literature
on routing in DTNs ( [10] [60] [9] [20] [21] [61] [62] [8] [26] ) assumes that data
packets are independent and uncorrelated with one another. In this work, we
assert that in the face of inherent intermittent connectivity, knowledge of appli-
cation semantics can be exploited to improve resource allocation and application
performance in the network. We support our claim with the following scenarios.
Scenario 1 In Twitter-like or micro-blogging applications where update mes-
sages are distributed over time, it is necessary that a subscriber receives these
updates in an ordered sequence. Messages that arrive out of order cannot be
displayed or used by the subscriber, and have to be either buered or discarded
until earlier updates have all arrived. With knowledge of application semantics,
intermediate relaying nodes can assign higher priorities to earlier updates so that
they are scheduled to be sent or routed before later updates.
Scenario 2 In le sharing applications, all the data blocks (or components)
of a single le must be received by the destination for the le transfer to be
deemed successful. When relay nodes are aware of such dependencies between
blocks of data, the missing data blocks of an ongoing le transfer can be assigned
with higher priorities to increase the number of successful le transfers, which
can be especially signicant in resource-constrained DTNs. For example, it is
much better that 50% of le downloads complete successfully (i.e. with 100% of
the blocks received in each le transfer), as compared to the case whereby 100%
of le downloads receive 50% of their individual data blocks - resulting in no
successful le downloads at all.
Scenario 3 In applications whereby data blocks in a stream of data have
varying importance, application semantic awareness enables the network to man-
age its resources in a more ecient manner, resulting in better application per-
formance. For example, video frames that are encoded in MPEG format can
be classied as I, P or B frames - in order of descending importance. In the
event of the loss of an I frame, all the corresponding P and B frames in the same
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data stream cannot be used. In contrast, the loss of a P frame aects only the
corresponding B frames in the same stream.
Based on the scenarios that we have illustrated, it is obvious that existing
DTN routing algorithms are inadequate and do not optimize application-level
performance as they: (i) ignore application semantics; and (ii) are evaluated
based on conventional networking metrics such as packet delivery ratio and la-
tency - which have little correlation with application-level performance metrics.
To enable DTN routing algorithms to take into consideration of application
semantics, we propose a mechanism to capture application semantics based on
dependency relationships. By translating dependency relationships into hints
that can be used by resource allocation schemes, the mechanism allows better
resource allocation to improve the application performance. In addition, the
mechanism is general and can be used to model a large class of applications.
Information about dependency relationship can be tagged along with little
overhead to control messages disseminated by existing DTN routing algorithms.
The DTN routing algorithms can potentially make use of the information to en-
hance performance. In this work, we show how a simple DTN routing algorithm
- Epidemic, and a complex Rapid-like [10] DTN routing algorithm can utilize
the dependency relationships for routing purposes.
3.1 Dependency Graph
3.1.1 Obtaining dependency information from Application
As mentioned earlier, there are many cases where awareness of application se-
mantics can be exploited to provide benets to the network nodes for resource
allocation purpose. However, in order to exploit these dependencies, we need a
way to capture them in an organized manner so that they can be exploited al-
gorithmically. While this imposes requirements on the applications we support,
we show that such information is already available from many existing popular
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applications as follows:
Web pages
Web pages and related multimedia objects reference each other using hyperlinks.
This information can be harnessed to build the dependency graph. Application
such as HTTrack (http://www.httrack.com) uses hyperlink information to ex-
tract the dependencies among dierent web pages.
Social network applications
Social network applications such as Facebook Graph API and Twitter API allow
access to data generated by the users. The data is available in a structured for-
mat. For instance, facebook wall data for a user is returned in JSON (JavaScript
Object Notation) format. Wall objects contain posts by the user, comments of
friends of a user and other information which can be represented as dependency
graphs.
Software update management tools
Software updates are often automated. Most software update management util-
ities are accompanied by tools to extract the dependencies of the updates. For
instance, apt-cache (http://linux.die.net/man/8/apt-cache), a package handling
utility, exports the dependencies of a package using DOT, a plain text graph de-
scription language. This information can be used to build a dependency graph.
A tool that performs a similar function for Microsoft Windows based platform
is dependency walker (http://www.dependencywalker.com).
Media les
Media le formats such as MPEG have the I-P-B frame structure which fa-
cilitates the building of dependency graph. The I-P-B frame structure is well
established and used extensively in media applications.
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Normal data les
Data les are the simplest case of dependencies where all data blocks are required
for the le to be useful.
3.1.2 Application Model
We assume that dierent application types can run on a DTN and many instances
of an application are possible. We dene the terminologies used below.
 Block: A block of data is the unit of data transmitted or received over a
wireless link. We assume that there is a maximum block size similar to the
idea of a maximum transmission unit (MTU). Note that each data block
is sent in the form of a message in the DTN.
 Update: An update is a set of data blocks which forms an unit of data
input to/from the user application. An update may be fragmented in the
delivery process. Such fragmentation will lead to blocks from the same
update becoming reordered or being delivered over dierent paths due to
intermittent connectivity.
 Channel: A channel is dened as a sequence of updates. A user applica-
tion is a consumer of this channel and each channel is associated with an
application type. For instance, a channel that produces twitter feed will
be consumed by twitter clients. The updates belonging to a channel could
originate from any of the participating nodes in the DTN and be consumed
by any of the participating nodes.
The relationships among block, update and channel are shown in Figure 3.1.
Users express their interest to a channel, for example, a twitter feed, a par-
ticular le sharing session or a podcast feed by subscribing to that channel.
Updates can be periodic or aperiodic depending on the application. The size of
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Figure 3.1: Relationships among block, update and channel.
each update may also vary.
Due to intermittent connectivity, blocks of an update can follow dierent
paths to reach the subscriber nodes where they are re-assembled. Further, blocks
may arrive at the subscriber nodes out-of-order.
3.1.3 Dependency Model
The denition and structure of the dependency graph used in this work is pre-
sented below.
Denition: Dependency Graph A dependency graph Gd = (Vd; Ed)
where Vd is the set of vertices and Ed the set of edges, is a directed graph where
if there is a directed path from node A 2 Vd to node B 2 Vd, then node A
depends on node B.
Denition: Dependency set of node A Given a dependency graph Gd,
the dependency set of node A, Gd(A), is dened as the set of nodes reachable
from node A in Gd. Therefore, a node j 2 Gd(A) if there is a directed path from
node A to j.
One way to think of the dependency set of node A is that all nodes in this set
must be received by the subscriber before node A can be used by the application.
Dependencies can be dened among blocks as well as updates. Hence, the nodes
in Gd can be either blocks or updates. Finding the dependency set of a node
involves a simple depth rst search and is hence very ecient.
Denition: Task For each update u, there is an associated task. When
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all updates in Gd(u) are received by the subscriber, update u can be utilized by
the application and the task associated with u is completed.
Figure 3.2: Example of a dependency graph
Figure 3.2 shows a simple dependency graph. Following from the denition







From the application's perspective, task completion and latency are more
useful than measures looking at only data block delivery statistics. We use the
following three applications to further illustrate the dependency graph concept.
1. streaming data/messaging, where delivery must be in order;
2. le download where delivery is completed only when all blocks are received
by the subscriber;
3. video le compressed in MPEG format with I, P and B frames.
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Update i-1 Update i+2Update i+1Update i
Block Block Block Block
Later update can be used only if all previous updates are present
Earlier Updates Later Updates
Figure 3.3: Dependency graph of messaging application.





All blocks within an update are related but the updates are independent
Figure 3.4: Dependency graph of le sharing application.
Figure 3.5: Dependency graph of IPB group of pictures
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These three applications represent a range of dierent dependency charac-
teristics. In Figure 3.3, each message update is assumed to be relative small and
can t into a single data block. In this case, we only need to consider update
(as there is only one block per update). Since the dependency is strictly based
on message creation time, the dependency graph structure is a single linked list,
with each update pointing to the earlier update. Hence, if we consider an update
i created at time ti, all updates with creation times less than ti must be received
by the subscriber before update i can be delivered/processed. Therefore, for
update i, Gd(i) = f:::; i  1; ig.
Figure 3.4 shows the case for a le download/sharing application. In this
case, a single le is one update. If the le size is larger than a data block, the
le (a single update) will have multiple data blocks. In the gure shown, each
le has 3 data blocks.
First, consider the dependency on the block level, within an update. Since all
blocks must be received by the subscriber for the le download to be successful,
the dependency graph for all blocks within an update is a complete graph where
all blocks depends on each other. For a block b, Gd(b) is the set of all blocks of
the same update. Also, all blocks of the same update have the same dependency
set.
At the update level, we assume that the updates are independent. Therefore,
subscribers can receive and utilize these update les independently. For update
i, Gd(i) = i.
In Figure 3.5, we consider the case where the dependencies are more involved
than the previous two examples. The example is based on the types of pictures
or frames (the I-, P- and B- frames) used in MPEG video compression algorithm
that exploits temporal redundancy. An update can be either a I-, P- or B-
frame. An I-frame is intra-coded, which in eect is a fully specied picture, like
a conventional static image le. A P-frame may reference previous I- and P-
frames while a B-frame may reference both previous and next I- and P- frames
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for decoding.
Each frame is in turn made up of a single or multiple data blocks. The I-
frames and P-frames are usually bigger than the B-frames. Depending on the
video bit rate, one or more B-frames may be transmitted as a single data block
but the I-frames are likely to be fragmented into multiple data blocks. Within
a frame, as in the previous case, if there are multiple blocks, the dependency
graph for these blocks forms a complete graph.
Take the example of a B-frame. The task associated with this B-frame is only
completed when all frames/updates that this B-frame depends on are received
by the subscriber.
Once the dependency relationships among data blocks can be represented in
a structured way, it is possible to design algorithms that take into account these
dependencies. In section 3.2, we describe how a given DTN routing algorithm
can be enhanced to take advantage of this information.
3.2 Depedendency-Aware Routing
As highlighted earlier, all data blocks of a task must be received by the destina-
tion before these blocks can be consumed by the application. Due to intermittent
connectivity and limited buer storage available at relay nodes, it is likely that
blocks belonging to the same task will be split into many smaller parts and re-
layed through dierent nodes before arriving at the destination. If any one of
these parts does not reach the destination, blocks from the same task that have
been delivered cannot be used for that task.
Our proposed dependency graph approach allows relay nodes to be aware
of the dependency relationships of the data blocks in a task. As a result, relay
nodes can make use of these dependency relationships to schedule important and
related blocks with higher priority.
Dependency-aware DTN routing algorithms need not be designed from scratched.
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Existing DTN routing algorithms can be enhanced with dependency awareness
to improve on its routing decision. We show in Section 3.2.1 how we can modify a
simple Epidemic routing algorithm into a dependency-aware routing algorithm.
Next, we show in Section 3.2.3 how we modify a more complex, utility based
RAPID-like routing algorithm into a dependency-aware routing algorithm.
3.2.1 Dependency-Aware Epidemic
In this section, we show how one can enhance the simple Epidemic algorithm to
be dependency-aware. We called this enhanced Epidemic algorithm D-Epidemic.
Conceptually, D-Epidemic improves on Epidemic by performing scheduling
in a FIFO manner based on tasks rather than on data blocks. Recall that each
task has one or more data blocks that are associated with it. For relay nodes to
identify the blocks that are associated with a task, the dependency relationships
are sent in the form of metadata to the relay nodes.
When a task is scheduled to be sent to a relay node, all data blocks in the
node's buer associated with the task will be sent together. However, note that
if a data block has already been sent due to its association with other scheduled
tasks, it will not be sent again.
In addition, D-Epidemic maintains two logical FIFO queues, a high priority
and a low priority queue. During a contact, a node always sends tasks from the
high priority queue rst, follow by the low priority queue. In the event of buer
contention, nodes always drop tasks (and their associated data blocks) from the
low priority queue rst, unless the data blocks are also associated with other
tasks.
Mapping of a task to either the high or low priority queue depends on how
many of the task's data blocks are present in the node's buer. If all of the data
blocks associated with a task is present in the node's buer, we call such task a
full task. Otherwise, a task is a partial task since only part of the task is stored
in the node's buer.
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Full tasks are always stored in the high priority queue. On the other hand,
a partial task is given a one time probability of being stored in the high priority
queue. This probability, , is a system parameter. When  = 0, full tasks are
given strictly higher priority than partial task. In this case, full tasks may end
up being in buer for extended period of time, starving newer partial tasks. In
our evaluation, we set  = 0:5, giving higher priority to full task, and yet do not
excessively starve partial tasks.
Note that while D-Epidemic only exploits dependency in the simplest form,
it is sucient to demonstrate how dependency awareness can be used to enhance
a simple algorithm.
3.2.2 SAR
In this section, we describe a DTN routing algorithm we named Subscriber
Aware Routing or SAR. SAR is a utility based algorithm that has been speci-
cally modied from RAPID [10] algorithm to suit a publish/subscribe environ-
ment. We believe that a publish/subscribe environment is more suitable for
supporting the DTN applications that we used in the evaluation. SAR is con-
sidered to be complex as it incorporates a number of well known techniques that
exploit contact history and keeps track of data availability on nodes in its utility
computation to enhance delivery ratio and latency. We will modify SAR to be
dependency-aware in section 3.2.3.
Overview of SAR
When two nodes using SAR are in contact, they rst exchange metadata and
then compute a utility value for every data block in its buer. Each node then
computes the utility gain value for each data block assuming that the data block
is replicated to the peer node. Data blocks are then replicated to the other peer
in descending order of utility gain value. In addition, each node computes a
utility loss value for each data block in buer assuming that the data block is
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dropped. In the event of buer contention, SAR drops data blocks in ascending
order of utility loss value.
We describe the operations of SAR in more detail below.
Metadata exchange
When two nodes using SAR are in contact, the following metadata is exchanged:
(a) Contact history (inter-contact time)
(b) List of channels subscribed by each known nodes
(c) Known data blocks and their list of nodes known to have a copy of it
In (a), a table of node contact history that contains the durations between
each successive contact for each node (inter-contact duration) is sent. Using
history of inter-contact duration, nodes can estimate the delivery latencies of
data blocks to their subscribers.
To allow relay nodes to know the subscribers of each data block, subscription
details of each known node is sent in (b). This allows relay nodes to make
informed decision on how to route the data blocks. The subscription details
contain the matching tags for matching published contents to the subscribers.
In (c), known data blocks and their list of nodes known to have a copy of it
is sent. This allows a node to compute and estimate the delivery latency of a
data block to its subscribers, and how many subscribers already received a copy
of the data block.
Estimating data block delivery latency
The contact (or meeting) times for nodes made up a large portion of delivery
latency. Nodes estimate the expected meeting time from the source to the des-
tination node as follows:
Node A estimates E(MAC), the expected time for node A to meet node C
using the contact history (inter-contact duration) that is exchanged as part of
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the metadata. E(MAC) is approximated using the expected time taken for A to
meet C in at most h hops. For example, if A meets C via an intermediary B,
the expected inter-contact time is computed as the expected time for A to meet
B and then B to meet C. We restrict h=3 in our implementation. RAPID and
several other DTN routing protocols [10] [9] [8] [32] have use similar techniques
to estimate meeting probability among peers. If two nodes never meet even via
three intermediate nodes, the expected inter-contact time is set to innity.
Suppose data block i has been replicated at nodes R = fr1; :::; rkg and the








Note that equation (3.1) assumes the meeting times to be exponentially dis-
tributed. The distribution of meeting times in the traces (eg. DieselNet) are
very dicult to model. Nodes may change their routes many times in the traces
and the inter-contact distribution is noisy. Approximating meeting times as ex-
ponentially distributed makes delay estimates easy to compute and has been
reported to perform well in practice, see for example, [10], [26].
The computation described above works only for a single (known) destina-
tion. In general, there can multiple destinations and this is shown in the utility
computation to be described in the next section.
Utility Computation
We dene QR;S(i), the sum of the estimated latency that data block i will take
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where R is the set of nodes having a copy of data block i, and S is the set of
subscribers which need data block i and has not received it. Note that QR;S(i)
is 0 when i has been delivered to all the subscribers.
QR;S(i) allows SAR to have a quantiable delivery metric that can be used to
measure how much delivery latency is reduced if block i is replicated to another
node. As data blocks may be of dierent sizes, replicating each of them will use
dierent amount of resources. Hence the utility gain is normalized by the size of
the data block.
For example, if data block i is replicated to node rk, then the utility gain
normalized by the size of the data block is:
QR;S(i) Q(R+rk);S(i)
sizei
; where rk =2 R (3.3)
3.2.3 Dependency and Subscriber-Aware Routing (DSAR)
In this section, we show how to modify SAR into a dependency-aware routing
algorithm. We named the dependency-aware version of SAR to be Dependency
and Subscriber Aware Routing (DSAR).
We make two changes to SAR. Firstly, we need to send dependency rela-
tionship information to relay nodes. Dependency relationship information can
be sent in the form of metadata together with their associated data blocks.
Secondly, we need to modify the utility computation function to take into con-
sideration dependency relationship information.
Task Utility Computation
In SAR, data block delivery latency is the main component used for utility
computation. However, for DSAR, we need to take into consideration both data
block and task delivery for utility computation.
We dened task contribution for a task as the ratio of undelivered data blocks
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of the task in the node's buer over the total number of (estimated) undelivered
blocks of the task. As an illustration, consider a task with a total of 100 data
blocks and 20 data blocks of this task are known to have been delivered. If a node
has 60 undelivered data blocks out of the 80 remaining data blocks in its buer,
the node can contribute 6080 or 75% to the task. Note that task contribution has
to be computed for each subscriber separately since each subscriber may have
received dierent subset of a task.
The value of task contribution captures the utility of a set of data blocks for
task completion. It also requires fairly minimum information to compute. The
number of undelivered blocks in buer is locally available and the number of
undelivered data can be estimated based on the acknowledgement messages.
We modify the SAR utility function by including the task contribution as a
parameter factor in the utility computation. Specically, we dene DSAR utility






[DR;s(i) C(t; s)] (3.4)
where T is the set of tasks which depends on data block i, St is the set of
subscribers of task t that has not received data block i, and C(T; s) is the task
contribution for task t and subscriber s.
We dene the utility gain function of DSAR as the increase in delivery metric
with respect to VR;S;T (i). Specically, if node A has a data block i to replicate
to node B, node A computes the normalized utility gain of replicating data block
i to node B as follows:
GAB(i) =
V(A2R;B=2R);S;T (i)  V(A;B2R);S;T (i)
sizei
(3.5)
Similarly, the utility loss function of DSAR is dened as the decrease in
delivery metric with respect to VR;S;T (i), normalized by the size of data block
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being dropped. During buer contention, node A will drop the data block that
has the lowest utility loss value. It computes utility loss value for data block i
as follows:
LA(i) =
V(A=2R);S;T (i)  V(A2R);S;T (i)
sizei
(3.6)
When two nodes meet, DSAR nodes replicate data blocks in descending order
of utiltiy gain value. In the event of buer contention, DSAR nodes drop data
blocks in ascending order of utility loss.
There are two overheads when we convert SAR to DSAR, namely sending the
dependency lists and utility computation. Dependency lists need to be stored
in the buer as well as exchanged when two nodes communicate. However, the
dependency lists can be stored very eciently using a bitmap. As each single
data block is in order of few KBs, the overhead is relatively small.
Utility computation of DSAR as compared to SAR involves an additional
multiplication for task contribution. Task contribution requires node to keep
track of the data blocks belonging to the task that has yet been delivered. As
existing routing schemes like SAR already incorporates block delivery acknowl-
edgements, computing task completion is straightforward.
3.2.4 Mixed Trac
In the discussion so far, we assume that dependencies for all data blocks are
known. In practice, this may not be possible. A mixture of data blocks with
known and unknown dependencies can be handled in the following way.
For D-Epidemic, two logical queues are maintained, one for trac with known
dependencies and one for those without. For the logical queue with known
dependenices, the same high and low priority queues are maintained as described
in Section 3.2.1. For the logical queue with unknown dependencies, data blocks
are maintained in a FIFO manner. Data blocks are sent in a round-robin manner
between the two logical queues of known and unknown dependencies. For the
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known dependencies trac, all data blocks belonging to at least one task are
sent before switching to the queue with unknown dependencies trac. Similar
amount of unknown dependencies trac are then sent before switching back
to the known dependencies trac to maintain service fairness. This algorithm
is clearly not optimized. While one could design a \smarter" algorithm that
performs better by taking into account more information, we believe that a
simple approach is better for demonstrating the eect of taking into account
task information in this case.
For DSAR, the approach is to generalize the computation of task utility
to trac with unknown dependencies. The two parameters required are task
contribution and dependency list. For task contribution, we estimate this value
(for all unknown trac) as the average task contribution value computed over all
the known dependencies trac in the node's buer. For dependency, we simply
assume that each data block with unknown dependency belongs to only one task.
The performance with mixed trac is evaluated in Section 3.3.
3.3 Simulation Evaluation
In the evaluation, we compare DSAR and D-Epidemic algorithm with SAR and
Epidemic algorithm respectively. Comparing SAR to DSAR and Epidemic to
D-Epidemic allow us to see the performance gain by utilizing dependency infor-
mation of data blocks in tasks.
The metrics used in the evaluation are Task Completion Ratio (TCR), Block






where S is the set of subscribers, Ts is the set of tasks received by subscriber s,
and Tps is the set of tasks being subscribed to by subscriber s. TCR captures
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the ability of the algorithm to complete the generated tasks.
BDR is similar to the delivery ratio metric used in unicast routing algo-
rithms. However, in our evaluation, BDR is extended to a Publish/Subscribe






where S is the set of subscribers, Bs is the set of data blocks received by sub-
scriber s, and Bps is the set of data blocks that are part of the tasks being
subscribed to by subscriber s.
Finally, task latency is dened as the time dierence between subscriber
successfully received all blocks of the task and the time that the subscriber has
subscribed to the task.
Two application types are used in the simulation, namely: le and linux
package updates.
Linux package updates are modeled as downloads of the application TraceR-
oute along with their package dependencies. We obtain the package dependencies
of TraceRoute using apt-cache [63]. The dependencies characteristics of this ap-
plication can be described as having a total of 12 updates. 3 of the updates
depend on 7 other updates and 1 of the updates depends on all the other 11
updates. In addition, each of these updates consist of a set of blocks whose
dependency graph is a complete graph.
Trac for the le application is generated as a set of blocks whose dependency
graph is a complete graph. In the case of a complete graph, the reception of all
data blocks in the graph is counted as one task completion.
Our evaluation are based on the mobility traces of taxi cabs in San Francisco
[64], and the Haggle Infocom 05 [65] trace.
The San Francisco taxi (SanCab) trace consist of the locations of approxi-
mately 500 taxis collected over 30 days in the Sans Francisco Bay Area. Using
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the reported GPS locations, we assume a wireless range of 100m and create
connections for each pair of nodes if they are within a distance of 100m. We
(randomly) picked the rst and the tenth day of the trace for simulation. The
trace for each day is further split into 2 segments, giving a total of 4 traces each
having 12 hours of trace data. The simulation results reported are the average
of the 4 traces.
The Haggle trace consists of a 3 day long trace that is based on a human
mobility experiment in Infocomm 2005. 41 volunteers joined the experiment and
was each given an iMote device that can communicate with one another using
Bluetooth. The trace includes connection events among these iMotes devices
(Class 1 devices) and also to other Bluetooth-capable devices (Class 2 devices).
We removed connection events from the Haggle trace that lasted less than one
second or involved the singular appearance of a node since meaningful data
transfer is likely to require setup time and nodes incapable of routing data may
be ignored. After the transformation, the traces left with only events involving
the 41 iMotes devices. We further split the Haggle trace into 3 segments, and
the results reported are the average of the 3 segments.
Table 3.1 gives the default conguration for the simulation scenarios discussed
later. Note that each data block is equivalent to one bundle and for each channel,
a node is randomly chosen to be the publisher. Unless otherwise stated, these
parameters will be used throughout the simulation.
3.3.1 Eect of varying buer
We rst study the eect of varying buer size. Figure 3.6 shows the Task Com-
pletion Ratio (TCR) and Block Delivery Ratio (BDR) results. In terms of TCR,
DSAR and D-Epidemic performs substantially better than their respective coun-
terparts SAR and Epidemic, especially when buer size is very limited. At 12MB,
DSAR is able to complete 74% and 17% more tasks than SAR in the SanCab
and Haggle trace respectively, while D-Epidemic is able to complete 583% and
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Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter SanCab Haggle
Number of publishers 24 8
Number of subscribers 24 8
Channels subscribed per subscribers 8 8
Number of blocks (File application) 40-140 40-140
Avg injection rate in blocks (File application) 180/hr 180/hr
Number of blocks (Linux package) 10-180 10-180
Avg injection rate in blocks (Linux package) 150/hr 150/hr
Size of the data block 50KB 50KB
Transmission Rate 2Mbps 1Mbps
Buer Size 50MB 50MB
Bundle Expiry Time 6 hours 6 hours
60% more tasks than Epidemic in the SanCab and Haggle trace respectively.
In terms of BDR, SAR outperforms DSAR for both SanCab and Haggle
traces. This is expected since SAR is optimized for BDR while DSAR is opti-
mized for TCR. In addition, DSAR has overhead of sending the dependency list.
Note however, TCR is the more relevant metric for application performance.
Hence, higher BDR is not as useful as higher TCR.
While DSAR is able to achieve higher TCR performance, it is clear that the
improvement is much larger in the SanCab trace than in the Haggle trace. This
can be explained by looking at how likely a task will be split through multi-
hop delivery. If the task is not split and is delivered to a subscriber in a single
contact, dependency awareness would not matter much since the entire task is
already being delivered as a single block.
From the simulation results, considering only tasks with at least one block
being delivered, we observe the following when SAR is used on the Haggle trace:
56.7% of the tasks are delivered in full using 1 contact, 16.3% are delivered in full
using multiple contacts and 27% are partially delivered. As a result, the possible
performance gain achievable by DSAR is limited since it can only improve on














































































































Figure 3.6: Eect of Buer Size
the remaining 27% that are partially delivered. On the other hand, when SAR
is used on the SanCab trace, only 10.9% of the tasks are delivered in full using
1 contact, 40.8% are delivered in full using multiple contacts and 48.3% are
partially delivered. DSAR is thus able to improve on the remaining 48.3% that
are partially delivered. Therefore, it is clear that the characteristics of the traces
play a very important role in determining how eective task awareness can be.
Figure 3.7(a) shows the CDF graphs of contact duration of the SanCab and
Haggle traces. Clearly, the SanCab trace consists of many more short duration
contacts than the Haggle trace, causing much more connection breaks during






















































(b) Distribution of Hop Count
Figure 3.7: Trace statistics
data transfer. For example, over 60% of the contacts in the SanCab trace are
shorter than 30 seconds, while only about 10% of the contacts in the Haggle
trace are shorter than 30 seconds. Similarly, Figure 3.7(b) shows the hop count
distribution of SAR when the data blocks are delivered. 95.7% of the packets
in the Haggle traces are delivered in 5 hops or less. On the other hand, in the
SanCab trace, 41.8% of the packets takes 6 or more hops to reach the subscriber.
The results from both gures show that tasks are much more likely to split
and be delivered over multiple paths in the SanCab trace. Without any depen-
dency relationship information, nodes in SAR (or Epidemic) may end up wasting
resources delivering many partially completed tasks to the subscribers.
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In summary, while our dependency-aware routing scheme is able to improve
performance in both traces, it perform much better when contacts are intermit-
tently short, and whereby delivery would occur over more hops and dierent
paths. Our approach thus works best in DTN environments with high mobility,

























































































































(d) Latency Distribution (Haggle)
Figure 3.8: Eect of Transmission Rate
3.3.2 Eect of Varying Tranmission Rate
In this section, we study the eect of varying transmission rate. We vary trans-
mission rate from 0.5Mbps to 10Mbps. Figure 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) shows the TCR
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results of the simulation.
The results here are quite similar to varying buer sizes. In all cases, the
dependency-aware routing algorithms DSAR and D-Epidemic outperform their
respective dependency ignorant counterparts, and the performance gain is much
larger in the SanCab trace than in the Haggle trace. For TCR, the improvement
of DSAR over SAR reaches up to 100% in the SanCab trace. For D-Epidemic,
the improvement over Epidemic reaches up to 197% in the SanCab trace.
3.3.3 Task Latency Distribution
We analyze the task latency distribution in this section. The default simulation
parameter is used (see table 3.1). Figures 3.8(c) and 3.8(d) show the task latency
distribution.
The dependency-aware DSAR and D-Epidemic is able to consistently deliver
more tasks in a shorter time. In terms of task completion latency, in the SanCab
trace, 58% of the tasks in DSAR completes within 3 hours. For SAR, the ratio
is 45% in 3 hours. The ratios for D-Epidemic and Epidemic are 26% and 5%
respectively for task completion within 3 hours.
3.3.4 Task Completion for Dierent Task Sizes
Results in the previous sections only consider aggregated TCR across all task
sizes. While dependency-aware routing algorithms signicantly outperform non-
dependency-aware routing algorithms, it is also important to look at the task
completion ratio for dierent task sizes. If the gain in overall TCR is at the
expense of lowering TCR for large tasks (which takes up more resources to
complete) to benet small tasks, the performance gain will not be as attractive.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the breakdown in task delivery over dierent task
sizes for both traces. The results shown are measured using the default simu-
lation parameter shown in Table 3.1. There are improvements in task delivery
for DSAR for both SanCab and Haggle trace. The result for D-Epidemic is less
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impressive. For the larger task sizes (100 blocks or more), there is a decrease in
task delivery though a substantial number of the large tasks are still able to com-
plete and large tasks are not overly penalized. This trade-o can be attributed
to the fact that D-Epidemic has strong preference over complete task in buer,
and hence indirectly favours smaller tasks as they are less likely to be split.
Table 3.2: Total Delivered Task Distribution (SanCab)
Task size Epidemic D-Epidemic SAR DSAR
(blocks) (=0.5)
10 1877 5667 4923 6597
15 1731 4154 3491 4518
40 291 855 630 841
60 110 256 496 599
80 133 167 935 1291
100 66 63 535 622
120 99 64 1012 1423
140 15 14 383 447
180 13 7 255 345
All 96535 199100 505815 664240
Table 3.3: Total Delivered Task Distribution (Haggle)
Task size Epidemic D-Epidemic SAR DSAR
(blocks) (=0.5)
10 129 211 255 302
15 106 129 218 293
40 18 27 78 80
60 51 52 84 88
80 59 84 115 137
100 38 50 47 54
120 54 54 106 107
140 40 49 57 53
180 9 5 19 21
All 28880 34205 52000 56295
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3.3.5 Mixed Trac Type
In this section, we evaluate the performance when there are trac with both
known and unknown dependencies. In the simulation, the default setting (see
Table 3.1) is used, except that 50% of the trac does not provide dependency
data. The results are shown in Figure 3.9(a) and 3.9(b). DSAR-A and DSAR-
I show the TCR for known and unknown dependency trac respectively for
DSAR. For DSAR, there is improvement for known dependencies trac when
compared to their dependency ignorant counterparts. For unknown dependencies
trac, DSAR provides rather similar performance compared to SAR.
3.4 Conclusion
We have shown that in the context of DTN where connectivities are intermittent,
it is very benecial, if not crucial, for application semantics to be known to the
network nodes in order to improve performance. We proposed to use dependency
graph to capture the application semantics based on dependency relationships
and showed that dependency relationships can be added to existing DTN routing
algorithms. We illustrated our approach by showing how two routing algorithms
(Epidemic and SAR) can be enhanced to be dependency-aware. In addition,
the enhanced routing algorithms can be further modied to handle mixed trac
type - mixture of data blocks with known and unknown dependencies.



























































(b) TCR (Haggle) - Mixed trac




The previous chapter consider the role of nodes in the DTN as simply send-
ing/relaying messages. However, nodes can perform cooperative tasks apart from
merely relaying messages. In this chapter, we consider resource management in
a class of applications in which nodes in the DTN participate in completing
application-related tasks in the system. Nodes typically come together (forming
a DTN) to support the application by completing application-related tasks. We
consider a simple model as follows.
We assume that the system consists of a number of nodes in the system with
similar task processing capability. Each node is able to process at most one
task at any point of time. When a node is processing a task, its status is busy,
otherwise its status is free.
The system consists of an unknown number of tasks that may appear in the
system at dierent times without a priori knowledge. Each task may be handled
by any free nodes in the system. We assume that all the nodes in the system
have similar processing capability, taking similar amount of time ti to complete
task i. However, there may be a cost Cxi (t) associated with node x for accepting
54
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task i at time t. For example, if at time t, task i and node x are at dierent
locations, then node x would need to travel to task i location, incurring a cost
Cxi (t).
Each node only has partial knowledge of the existence of all the tasks in the
system. If a node discover a new task and is busy, it may try to inform other
nodes in the DTN about the task. Nodes in the DTN collaboratively tries to
allocate the tasks in the system with an objective in mind (such as minimizing
average task completion delay, minimizing the maximum waiting time to start
processing a task etc). However, due to time constraints and communication
delay, nodes are likely to only able to gather partial knowledge of the system
before a decision has to be made.
Example of applications that falls into the above described model includes
Search and Rescue operations in which nodes actively search for victims in the
disaster location. Each task involves picking up the victim and sending the
victim to a safe location (such as hospital). If a victim is found by a busy
node, the busy node may sends out request to other nodes nearby to pickup the
discovered victim. Another possible example of applications that falls into the
above described model includes participatory sensing applications. In participa-
tory sensing applications, nodes may be tasked to perform sensing operations at
certain locations.
In this work, we look at a possible real life taxi scenario that falls into the
above described model. We consider the case of a DTN that is formed by taxis
and waiting clients. Both taxis and (some) clients are equipped with short range
wireless devices such as WiFi to allow them to communicate in the DTN. In
addition, taxis are equipped with location-aware devices such as a GPS device.
A task in this application would be a taxi picking up a client and sending the
client to its destination. Client demands at each region vary over time and is
not known to the taxis beforehand. The objective is to minimize the number of
clients that have waited for a long period of time (eg. waited for an hour).
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We propose Taxi Advisory Dispatch System (TADS), a distributed system
in which taxis collaboratively determine the regions with high client demands
and avoid having excessive free taxis moving into the same region. TADS runs
on DTN and is particularly challenging to design because taxis have limited
communication opportunity. Due to limited communication and delay, each taxi
only has partial knowledge (eg. number of free taxis and clients in a region)
about the system. In addition, information received from other taxis may be
outdated quickly as taxis may move and change their status quickly. Clients
may also be picked up by other taxis and communication delay may hinder such
information from being made known to other taxis.
Exising work on distributed taxi booking system [5] [6] cannot be applied to
TADS because they do not consider a DTN environment whereby disconnection
is frequent. Ideally, we should assign taxis to regions so that the overall time
taken by the taxis to travel to the requested region is minimal. This is related
to the Linear Assignment Problem (LAP). Even though decentralized solutions
for LAP have been proposed [66] [67], they are not suitable for our work due to
very fast changing and intermittent connectivity environment.
Our approach to the problem involves nodes collaboratively estimating the
supply/demand of each region. A node that supposedly has the most information
on the supply/demand of a region sends out advisories to guide or suggest some
free taxis to move into the region. Advisories are generated carefully to avoid
having excessive free taxis moving into the same region.
We perform evaluation of TADS based on traces obtained from a large Singa-
pore taxi company that operates more than 15,000 taxis. Our results show that
TADS can reduce the number of clients with wait times longer than 60 minutes
by over 30%.
In the following sections, we rst give an introduction of the taxi transporta-
tion situation in Singapore. We then describe our system model and then give
a detail description of TADS.
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4.1 Introduction
Taxis form an important means of public transport for many countries. It pro-
vides a comfortable and convenient alternative to public transport such as buses
and rail. In Singapore, in particular, taxis are widely available and relatively
low-priced. As of November 2011, the number of taxis in Singapore is about
27,018 [68]. Compared to major cities like Hong Kong, London and New York,
Singapore has one of the highest number of taxis per million population [69].
However, even though Singapore has a high number of taxis, waiting time
for a taxi can still be long, depending on the location, time of day and weather
condition. For example, statistics [70] show that the average taxi waiting time
in the main shopping district can vary from 5 minutes to 38 minutes during the
same hourly interval among dierent locations that are only 1 to 2 kilometers
apart.
This large dierence in waiting times among nearby locations suggests that
there exist signicant imbalance in the supply and demand of taxis. If a number
of the free taxis were to be given advice to move to regions with higher demand,
long taxi waiting times can be reduced. In addition, it may also benet the free
taxis since they were given advice to move to regions with higher chances of
getting clients.
Our proposed system, Taxi Advisory Dispatch System (TADS), addresses
the above problem by sending advisory tokens to request some nearby taxis to
move to regions with a higher demand.
Note that such advisories may (slightly) increase the waiting times for clients
in regions with lower demand for taxis, while substantially reducing the waiting
time of regions with high demand.
The main objective of TADS is to minimize long waiting times rather than
the average waiting time over all regions. In addition, unlike a taxi booking
system, TADS deals with \ag down" clients and does not handle taxi bookings.
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TADS complements and is compatible with the existing taxi booking systems.
TADS assumes that taxis are equipped with short/mid range communication
devices such as WiFi for communication. Communication can be among taxis
or between a taxi and a client's smartphone. Use of WiFi keeps the running cost
of the system low compared to the use of cellular network.
In TADS, each taxi estimates the number of free taxis and clients in its vicin-
ity. Such information is used by a leader to determine the number of advisory
tokens to generate. A key challenge of TADS is to be able to perform state esti-
mation accurately in a distributed manner in a DTN environment. An important
aspect of TADS is to prevent excessive generation of advisory tokens as this may
lead to too many taxis moving into the same region which is undesirable.
4.2 System Model
Clients are classied into either simple clients or smart clients. A simple client
is someone who simply waits along the road and ags down a free taxi in sight.
A smart client is someone who uses a WiFi device (such as a smartphone) to
communicate with taxis to signal his/her intention to hire a taxi. Each smart
client has a unique client ID.
Taxis are equipped with GPS and WiFi. Each taxi is also given a unique ID
and time is synchronized through GPS. When two taxis are in wireless commu-
nication range, they exchange data. Other taxis who can overhear the communi-
cation can update their records as well. Taxis essentially come together forming
a peer-to-peer Delay Tolerant Network (DTN).
Taxi state is either FREE, POB (Passenger-On-Board) or BUSY. A taxi
state is in POB if it has a passenger on board. If the taxi is not available to
pickup clients due to other reasons (eg. taxi was booked, driver going for lunch
etc), then the taxi state will be BUSY. Note that both the POB and BUSY state
cannot pickup a client. However, it can be travelling on the road and can relay
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data or advisory tokens.
An advisory token is a message that request free taxi to move into a partic-
ular geographical region. Advisory tokens for a region are generated periodically
by a chosen leader taxi. For each region, during each monitoring period, taxis
oods taxi and clients records they have in possession to other taxis in vicinity.
The taxi that has the most number of records is chosen to be the leader for
the region. The leader taxi then generates a number of advisory tokens for the
region based on the information that it has.
A token includes an expiration time and can be exchanged wirelessly among
taxis. When a taxi receives a token, it may choose to accept or reject the advice.
If a taxi accepts the advice, the taxi changes its current path and move towards
the indicated region. The token is thus consumed.
It is important to note that an advisory token only advises a taxi to move
into a region. It does not assign a client to a taxi and hence no client information
is provided in the advisory. In addition, even after a taxi accepts an advice, it
is not necessary for the taxi to move into the targeted region. For example,
along its way to the region, the taxi may pick up a client. In which case, the
advisory is regenerated with the same expiration time as the initial advisory and
forwarded to other taxis. On the other hand, if the taxi rejects the advice, the
taxi continues to be the relay node of the advisory token until the token expires.
4.3 TADS in detail
TADS consists of 3 components: (1) state estimation (number of free taxis and
clients in each region), (2) generation of advisory tokens based on the estimated
states, and (3) distribution of advisory tokens. We assume that the entire region
of interest (e.g. the entire Singapore island) is divided into regions.
Table 4.1 lists the commonly used notations in the following sections. Through-
out this chapter, unless otherwise stated, operations are implicitly described with
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reference to the current monitoring period. For instance, Tr refers to the set of
taxis that have driven past or entered region r in the current monitoring period.
Table 4.1: Notations in TADS
Tr Set of taxis that have driven past or entered region r.
cntPOBr Total number of POB taxi records for region r.
cntFREEr Total number of FREE taxi records for region r.
totFREEr Total number of free taxis that have driven past or
entered region r.
totsimpler Total number of simple clients in region r.
totsmartr Total number of smart clients in region r.
ldrj Node j's replica copy of a leader record.
ldr:l The leader identity as indicated in the leader record.
ldr:r The region as indicated in the leader record.
ldr:score A score value as indicated in the leader record.
IDi Unique identity of node i.
Ms Start time of a monitoring period.
Mg Start time of a monitoring guard.
Me End time of a monitoring period (also the end time of
monitoring guard).
dist A system parameter that determines how far a record
is allowed to replicate.
4.3.1 State Estimation
State estimation is performed for each region periodically through monitoring






























Figure 4.1: Monitoring cycles.
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Let Ms and Me be the start and end of a monitoring period respectively. In
addition, letMg be the start of the guard duration. During [Ms,Mg), taxi i 2 Tr
participates in monitoring region r. Specically, taxis in Tr collaboratively try
to estimate the number of free taxis and clients in the region.
To estimate the number of free taxis moving into a region, whenever a free
taxi enters a region or when its status changes to free in the region, the free
taxi generates a unique FREE taxi record. This taxi record is then ooded
to all other taxis within a pre-dened distance or in pre-dened neighbouring
regions. Flooding allows data to spread faster and is a popular technique used
in DTNs [9] [10]. The taxi current location can be made known to the routing
layer, so that the routing layer can prevent further replication of a record that
is outside the area that it is supposed to be replicated.
Estimating the number of clients in a region is challenging since simple clients
are impossible to detect accurately without additional sensory inputs. TADS
obtains a conservative estimate on the number of simple clients in the region
through observing changes of taxi status from FREE to POB. When a free taxi
picks up a simple client, it generates a unique POB taxi record. The POB taxi
records are then ooded to other taxis in the region and its neighbouring regions.
For estimating the number of smart clients in a region, each smart client
generates a unique client record per monitoring period and forwards it to any
taxi that is within communication range. Note that smart clients do not need
to have their time synchronized through GPS. Their time can be synchronized
when they encounter a taxi. Taxis are time synchronized through GPS. Similar
to the POB taxi records, client records are ooded to other taxis in the region
and its neighbouring regions.
Note that no taxi or client record is generated during the guard duration
period [Mg,Me). The purpose of the guard duration is to allow some time for
generated records to \spread" to the leader taxi of the respective region before
the end of the monitoring period (see next section 4.3.2).
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In addition, note that for a smart client to be counted, it has to be able
to communicate to at least one taxi in the monitoring period. If there is no
taxi within communication range of the smart client, TADS will not know the
existence of the smart client.
To summarize, FREE taxi records are used for estimating the number of
available taxis. The total number of (simple and smart) clients is estimated by
adding the number of \ag down" pickups and number of smart clients records
seen in a monitoring period. TADS makes two assumptions. First, the size
of the data to be exchanged is small relative to the WiFi throughput available
even though contact times are not large. Second, while contacts among taxis
are intermittent due to their mobility, the density of taxis is suciently large so
that messages can reach neighbouring regions within minutes.
4.3.2 Generating Advisory Tokens
Advisory tokens are generated at the end of each monitoring period by elected
taxis (leaders). Throughout the monitoring period, taxis collaboratively elect a
leader for each region r. However, due to time constraint and long communi-
cation delay, TADS may not give a unique leader at the end of the monitoring
period. Hence, it includes heuristics to minimize the number of duplicate leaders
for a region.
TADS leader election scheme comprises of two components: (1) initial selec-
tion and (2) leader transfer/elimination.
For initial selection, suppose a taxi generates a taxi record (for monitoring)
or receives a client request directly from a client in the region. If the taxi does
not have any existing record for the region in the current monitoring period, it
volunteers itself to be a leader of the region. Hence, whenever there are any
events detected in a region, there will be at least one leader representative for
the region. If there are already existing records for the region in the current
monitoring period (which it receives from some other taxis), then it implies that
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there are already at least one leader in the region. To minimize the possibility
of duplicate leaders in the region, it shall not volunteer to be a leader.
Whenever a taxi encounters another taxi, they exchange records. Each taxi
will send their taxi, client and leader records to the other taxi. If leader records
for a region are dierent, the two taxis need to harmonize their leader records
for the region. The recorded leader with a larger leader record score (ie. larger
number of taxi and client records) is chosen and the taxi identier is used as the
tie breaker.
Next, for each region that a taxi is currently a leader, leader election is per-
formed between the two connected taxis. Each taxi sends their current location
to the other taxi. TADS picks the taxi that is currently closer in distance to the
vantage point of the region that they are electing to be the leader. A vantage
point is a pre-chosen location in the region that is assumed to have a higher
chance of meeting other taxi nodes. A typical vantage point can be a road
intersection whereby most taxis would pass by.
EncounterNode() in gure 4.2 shows the pseudocode when two taxis en-
counter and ElectLeader() in gure 4.3 shows the pseudocode for leader election
based on vantage point.
Line 2 and 3 of EncounterNode() (gure 4.2) simply replicates eligible taxi,
client and leader records to the other node (as required for monitoring). A record
is considered eligible if the current node distance is within a pre-dened distance
dist from the record respective region's vantage point. Both dist and regions'
vantage point are pre-dened system parameters that is known to all the taxis
in the system.
Having a large dist value allows taxis in vicinity to be more informed about
the situation in region r. However, it results in more resource usage since records
are now replicated to more taxis. Figure 4.4 shows an example in which the
square in the centre represents the region of interest. The dark grey circle rep-
resents a taxi and its associated arrow represents its current trajectory. The
CHAPTER 4. APPLICATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN DTN 64
1: EncounterNodei(Node j) f
2: Send/Receive eligible taxi/client records.
3: Send/Receive eligible leader records.
4: For each leader records ldrj received,
5: if ((ldr:scorej > ldr:scorei) or (ldr:scorej = ldr:scorei and
ldr:lj > ldr:li))
6: ldri  ldrj
7:
8: new Score  compute node new Score()
9: For each leader records ldr in node i,
10: if (ldr:l = i)
11: ldr:x new Score
12: new leader  ElectLeader(ldr:r, i, j)
13: if new leader=j
14: Send new leader of ldr to j
15: if send successful
16: ldr:l new leader
17: g
Figure 4.2: EncounterNode()
1: ElectLeader(r; i; j) f
2: disti  getDistance(i, VantagePoint(r))
3: distj  getDistance(j, VantagePoint(r))
4: if disti > distj
5: new leader  j
6: else if disti < distj
7: new leader  i
8: else
9: if IDi > IDj
10: new leader  i
11: else
12: new leader  j
13: return new leader
14: g
Figure 4.3: ElectLeader()
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dotted circle represents the taxi wireless communication range. Suppose taxi A
has some observation records for the region but it has now moved out of the
region. It encounters taxi C who is travelling in the reverse direction, moving
into the region soon. Assuming that their position is still within the distance
dist, taxi A replicates its records to taxi C. Taxi C eventually enters the region,
encounter taxi B, and replicates the records to taxi B. Noticed that in this case
if replication is not performed beyond the region of interest, then records in taxi




Figure 4.4: Example of replication beyond region of interest.
For line 4 to 6, taxi updates existing leader records if the newly received
records show that the claimed leader has a higher ldr.score. ldr.score is dened
to be the number of received client and taxi records. For example, if the leader
record in taxi A for region r shows that taxi C is the leader, and the newly
received leader record for region r shows that taxi D is the leader with a higher
IQ score, then taxi A will update the leader records to indicate that taxi D is
the leader for region r.
A taxi that has more records supposedly has a better picture of the state of
the region compared to a taxi that has fewer records. Preferably, a leader taxi
should have a better ldr.score so that it can make better decision in generating
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tokens. Note that ldr.score is a monotonically increasing value.
For line 8-11, taxis update their ldr.score since they may have received new
records due to line 2. In addition (line 12-16), for each region that the taxi
is currently a leader, taxi calls the function ElectLeader(). ElectLeader() picks
the taxi that is currently closer in distance to the vantage point of the region
that they are electing to be the leader. The rationale for line 12-16 is to enable
a leader to \transfer" leadership to a taxi that is closer to the vantage point.
Since vantage point is a location chosen to have higher chances of meeting other
taxis, it gives the leader higher chances of meeting other leaders (for leader
elimination), and receiving new records (for better ldr.score).
Figure 4.5 shows the scenario of four regions in which taxi A is the elected
leader for region W, Z and taxi B and C are leaders for region X and Y respec-
tively. Taxi A has earlier driven through region Z and is at region W at the end
of the monitoring period. It participated in the leader election for both regions
and became the leader due to having a higher ldr.score for both regions. Even
though taxi D has the same path as taxi A in this monitoring period, it is not




Region: W Region: X
Region: Y Region: Z
D
Figure 4.5: Example of leaders in regions.
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4.3.3 Determining Number of Advisory Tokens
At the end of a monitoring period, each leader will individually determine the
amount of advisory tokens to generate. As explained in section 4.3.1, the number
of client records is often fewer than the actual number of clients. If we simply
use the client record count without making any adjustment, we will miss out
many regions that require more free taxis.
Instead of using the number of taxi and client records directly, we take into
account the duration in which a taxi spends in either FREE or POB state in
the region, as well as the amount of time a client has been waiting for a taxi
(applicable only to smart client) to further improve the estimates. Intuitively,
if a taxi spends more time in FREE than POB in a region, supply of free taxis
may be higher in the region. Similarly, regions where clients have been waiting
for longer periods of time may have a higher demand for taxi.
TADS utilizes a score-based system to better reect the supply and demand
for taxis. The score-based system also attempts to compensate for the fact that
some advisory tokens may be unable to nd a free taxi.
GetNumberOfAdvisoriesToGenerate() presents the pseudocode for a leader
to determine the number of advisory tokens to generate for a region.
1: GetNumberOfAdvisoriesToGenerate(Region r)
2: Ssupplyr  cntFREEr
3: Ssmartr  cntsmartr + incsmartr
4: Ssimpler  cntPOBr + incsimpler
5: Sdemandr  Ssmartr + Ssimpler
6: n (Sdemandr   Ssupplyr )




incsmartr (line 3) adjusts for the number of smart clients. It is computed as
follows:




[k1(i) + k2(i)] (4.1)
where






c <= y, otherwise k1(i) = y,
 k2(i) = 0 if 2b
wi
dx
c <= y, otherwise k2(i) = bwidx c   blog2(y)c.
 y = 1% smart in system   1
wi is the amount of time that a smart client i has waited, and dx is a pre-dened
duration that is currently set to be the advisory token lifetime. y is the number
of simple clients per smart client in the system. The taxi company can provide
an estimated value of y based on the recent data that has been collected by
TADS. For example, taxis can upload their smart and POB records to the taxi
company and these records can be used to predict y on a monthly basis.
Intuitively, incsmartr is assigned a higher value when smart clients in the
region have waited for a longer period of time. It is initially set to increase
exponentially, but slows down to increase linearly once it reaches some threshold
(y) so that the number of tokens generated will not be too excessive. The idea
is that if a smart client has waited for a long time, chances are that simple
clients in the region may also have waited for a long time. (Note that there is no
mechanism in TADS that can detect the waiting time for simple clients). Hence,
TADS initially increases Ssmartr exponentially in the hope that it will also benet
the simple clients in the same region.
Next, let
 dPOBr (i) be the total duration that a taxi i 2 TPOBr was in status POB in
the region r after picking up a client in region r.
 dFREEr (i) be the total duration that a taxi i 2 TFREEr was in status FREE
in the region r.















cfr has a range of [0,1] and is set based on how long free taxis take to nd and
pickup clients in the region. We assume that the longer it takes, the fewer simple
clients there are and cfr is set to a smaller value.
incsimpler = cnt
pob
r  cfr (4.3)
incsimpler (line 4 in GetNumberOfAdvisoriesToGenerate()) is a correction fac-
tor that tries to compensate for the number of simple clients that are not ac-
counted for.
4.3.4 Forwarding Advisories
When two taxis meet, they exchange advisory tokens such that each taxi will
keep half of the total number of advisory tokens per region. For example, if taxi
A initially has n > 0 copies of advisories, and it encounters another taxi B (with
no copies of advisories), taxi A will forward to taxi B dn2 e copies of advisories
and keeps bn2 c copies of advisories itself. This approach of spreading advisories
is similar to the Binary Spray and Wait approach in [26], which is shown to have
the minimum expected delay in routing for nodes with IID mobility.
4.4 Simulation Evaluation
4.4.1 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluated our proposed system using traces obtained from a large taxi oper-
ator that operates more than 15,000 taxis in Singapore. The taxi trace includes
the location and status (FREE, POB and etc) information but does not contain
any connectivity information. In the evaluation, we use data from a particular
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week in November 2010.
We assume that each taxi has a communication range of 50m, while client to
taxi communication range is 30m (smartphone WiFi radios have a lower trans-
mission range). A free taxi will move to pick up a client if it is within 30m from
the client. To simulate the eects of queueing in taxi stands, if there are multiple
clients at a single location, the taxi picks up the client with the longest waiting
time.
The number of clients served in an hour varies from a few thousand to about
twenty thousand, depending on the time of the day. In the results presented,
\Current" refers to the existing system without TADS. We compare how TADS
performs compared to \Current". We divide the area of interest (Singapore
island) into xed-size regions. Each region is a 400m 400m grid in our simula-
tion. In the experiments, unless otherwise stated, the following parameters are
used:
 Percentage of smart clients: 50%
 Guard duration: 30 seconds
 Monitoring period: 3 minutes
 Flooding radius (dist): 2 km
 Vantage point: Center of each region
Generating Client Request
For each taxi status that changed from FREE to POB in the trace, we create a
client request record using the associated location and time. To avoid the same
taxi picking up the client immediately when the client appears in the simulation,
we defer the client arrival time by 10 minutes. Hence during simulation, this taxi
would have likely left the location and it will be up to another taxi to pickup
this client.
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In addition, we note that such a way of generating records loses the \bursti-
ness" of requests since client arrivals are constant osets from the service times
(taxi pickups) rather than the actual arrival times of clients which are not avail-
able.
In order to compensate for the loss of burstiness (which leads to shorter
waiting time), we increase the number of client requests by 10% in the system.
These additional arrivals follow the same time and location distributions of client
arrivals obtained from the taxi traces.
Generating Taxi Paths
Taxis in TADS change their paths after they accept an advisory token or pickup
a client. Since the clients' pickups are not the same as those in the original
traces, paths taken by the taxis are also dierent. In the simulation, based on
the traces, we create a database of taxi paths taken by a taxi.
Specically, each taxi path extracted from the taxi trace consists of the fol-
lowing:
1. Taxi movement information (GPS coordinates and time)
2. previous status - previous status of taxi
3. current status - current status of taxi
Whenever a taxi reaches the last point in the path that it has been assigned,
it will select a new path with the path starting location being closest in distance
to the current taxi location. In addition, the path being picked must be time
and status compatible with the current taxi. A path is time compatible if the
path start time is within 90 minutes from the current time. A path is status
compatible if the previous status of the path matches the current status of the
taxi.
In addition, we prevent taxi from picking a path with status FREE to POB.
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For a taxi to change status from FREE to POB, it must physically pickup a
client in our simluation.
Our scheme for selecting a taxi path has the following advantages:
 ability to capture current road conditions (eg. trac jam).
 ability to capture the drivers' preferred routes at dierent times of the day
(such as drivers moving to areas which they believe clients can be picked
up easily).
Accepting/Rejecting Advisory Tokens
In the simulation, we use the following procedure to simulate acceptance/rejection
of advisory token. When an advice is presented to a taxi, it randomly picks a
time compatible path that allows the taxi to move from the current region to
the requested region. If no such path exists or the path chosen takes more than
the remaining lifetime of the token to reach the requested region, the taxi rejects
the advice. Lifetime of each advisory token is set to 6 minutes.
In addition, the taxi will also reject an advisory if a client pickup is eminent
(eg. taxi already saw a client nearby). If the taxi current path is able to pick
up a client within 15 seconds, then we assume a pickup is eminent and the taxi
will reject any advisories presented to it.
4.4.2 Varying Time of Day and Number of Smart Clients
In this section, we evaluate the performance of TADS with varying numbers of
smart clients. As expected, TADS performs best when there are only smart
clients (ie. 100% smart clients) in the system. In the busy hour of 9am to 10am,
there is a 25% reduction in the 95th-percentile waiting time and 34% reduction
in the number of clients with over 60 minutes wait.
With only simple clients in the system, in the 9am to 10am interval, there
is only 7% reduction in the 95th-percentile waiting time and 8% reduction in





































































(b) Clients with over 60 minutes wait
Figure 4.6: Varying Time of Day and Smart Clients
the number of clients with over 60 minutes wait. However, even with a modest
10% of smart clients in the system, the improvement is still noticeable, a 12%
reduction in the 95th-percentile waiting time and 15% reduction in the number
of clients with over 60 minutes wait.
In terms of average waiting time from 9am to 10am (not shown in the graph),
the reduction in client waiting time is only 9% and 12% for 50% and 100% of
smart clients in the system respectively. As we have highlighted previously, we
do not expect the average times to reduce as much since TADS basically moves
free taxi from \free" to \busy" regions and such load balancing occurs on the
order of minutes.
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(b) Clients with over 60 minutes wait
Figure 4.7: Varying Load at 9am
In gure 4.7, we vary the number of clients request at 9am. The load is
varied as a percentage of the original number of client request at 9am. In all
cases evaluated, TADS is able to reduce the client waiting time and the number
of clients that has waited for over 60 minutes. At 130% load, the number of
clients with over 60 minutes wait is 566 in TADS and 750 when TADS is not
used.
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4.4.4 Bursty Client Arrivals
In this section, we look at the eect of a sudden increase in client requests in a
region. This corresponds to the situation such as a major show/game ending,
resulting in a sudden inux of clients. We randomly select 1 region and increase
the number of clients in the region over a 15 minutes period, starting at 9pm.
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(b) Over 30 and 60 minutes wait
Figure 4.8: Increasing number of client request in a region
As expected, as the number of clients increase, the client waiting time also
increases. However, TADS is able to reduce the average waiting time, as well as
the number of clients who waited for more than 30 and 60 minutes signicantly.
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When we increase the number of clients by 30, the number of clients with over
60 minutes wait for TADS is 4 and 7 when TADS is not used.
4.4.5 Accuracy in Generating Advisories
In this section, we look at the accuracy in determining the number of advisories
to generate. Due to nodes mobility and intermittent connectivity, a leader node
often has incomplete information about a region. In addition, duplicate leaders
for a region may also be possible. TADS mitigate the problem by performing
ooding and leader elimination/transfer in an attempt for leaders to gain more
knowledge and eliminate duplicate leaders for a region. We compare TADS
against a simpler scheme (LargeID) in this section. In the LargeID scheme,
nodes oods the known largest node ID in Tr. The node with the largest known
ID will be the leader for the region r.
Figure 4.9 shows the results comparing the accuracy in determining the num-
ber of advisories to generate. It shows the dierence in the number of advisory
tokens generated when compared to an oracle. To avoid comparing regions where
there are no advisories generated, we only consider regions that generate at least




























(a) Average tokens dierence
Figure 4.9: Accuracy in generating advisory tokens
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As expected, TADS performs better than LargeID scheme for all the evalu-
ated cases. Unlike LargeID scheme, TADS perform leader election to \transfer"
leadership to a node closer to the vantage point of a region. This allows a leader
to be closer to the region, and hence have higher opportunities to meet other
\duplicate" leaders for the region. It also allows a leader in TADS to have higher
chances of receiving new taxi records.
With a transmission range of 200m, the dierence in the average number of
tokens generated for TADS is 1.3 compared to Oracle. Note that the average
number of tokens generated by the Oracle is 6.7.
4.4.6 Dierent strategies for Generating Advisories
In this section, we evaluate 3 more dierent strategies for determining the number
of advisory tokens to generate and compare them to TADS.
For TADS(1) and TADS(16), incsmartr in equation 4.1 is always set to 0. For
every advisory token to be generated, the leader always generates 1 and 16 copies
for TADS(1) and TADS(16) respectively. For TADS(exp), incsmartr in equation
4.1 is allowed to increase exponentially (ie. y in equation 4.1 set to 1). Note
that more copies of advisories lead to a higher chance of an advisory reaching
a free taxi in a shorter time. The downside is that it risks requesting excessive
taxis into the same region.
Figure 4.10 shows the result using the dierent schemes. TADS(1) performs
the worst in terms of clients with over 60 minutes waiting time. However, in
terms of average free taxi duration after a taxi accepts/rejects an advisory, it
is the most attractive from the taxi driver's point of view. After accepting an
advisory, the average time that the taxi takes to pickup a client is much shorter
than if the taxi were to reject the advisory.
On the other hand, for TADS(16) and TADS(exp), too many tokens are
generated and a taxi is better o rejecting the advisory than to accept.
The result shows that the proposed TADS scheme that dynamically adjusts
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(b) Average taxi free duration after accepting/rejecting advi-
sory (9am)
Figure 4.10: Comparing dierent TADS schemes
the number of tokens based on load and waiting time is able to both reduce client
waiting time as well as shorten taxi cruising time before picking up a client.
4.4.7 Related work
A number of research works have been proposed to improve taxi booking service.
In [71], several temporal and spatial related advance bookings are chained and
assigned to a single taxi. This reduces the cruising time between free to busy
state when a taxi accepts a taxi booking.
In [72], the authors proposed to group taxi bookings within some time window
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and then dispatch them to a group of taxis. This allows for better proximity
assignment of taxis to clients.
In [5] [6], a three way handshake protocol is used to book taxi in a distributed
taxi booking system. Their work however consider scenarios whereby multi-
hop connectivity is present. Our work consider also the more general scenarios
whereby disconnection may occur frequently due to mobility and the sparsity of
taxis in some regions. Such multihop connectivity cannot be assumed.
In addition, our work is dierent from the above taxi booking systems in
that we target the taxi service for \ag down" clients rather than clients served
through taxi booking. No taxi bookings are involved in our system.
Ideally, we should assign taxis to regions so that the overall time taken by the
taxis to travel to the requested regions is minimal. This is related to the Linear
Assignment Problem (LAP). Even though decentralized solutions for LAP have
been proposed [66] [67], they are not suitable for our work due to very fast
changing and intermittent connectivity environment.
Part of TADS algorithm involves electing a taxi leader for each region. In
the literature, there are a number of leader election algorithms that have been
proposed for mobile ad hoc networks. We can broadly classify them here based
on whether the algorithms use geographical information.
Leader election algorithms that do not use geographical information includes
[73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78].
In [74], a leader-oriented directed acyclic graph (DAG) within each connected
component is maintained using link reversal techniques. This scheme is later ex-
tended by [75] to handle multiple topology changes. When the network stabilizes,
the algorithm always give a unique leader for each connected component.
In [73] [77] [78], the authors present \extrema-nding" leader-election algo-
rithms for mobile networks with the goal of electing as leader the node with the
highest priority according to some criterion (eg. battery life). Both proposed
algorithms are highly adaptive with ad hoc networks in the sense that it can tol-
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erate link failures, network partitions, nodes recovery, and merging of connected
network components associated with ad hoc networks.
The algorithms described above attempt to nd a leader within a connected
component, and do not consider geographical information. Leader election algo-
rithms that include geographical information includes [79] [80] [81].
Hatzis et al. [80] presented a leader election algorithm for mobile ad hoc
networks. When two or more mobile nodes meet, they exchange identities and
the winner is the one with the higher identity. Similar to our work, this simple
scheme does not guarantee that a unique leader can be found. A probabilistic
analysis is then given assuming nodes perform random walks.
In [79], the entire geographical space is divided into regions and leader elec-
tion is performed for each region assuming a single hop network. The leaders
are elected for the purpose of forming a backbone for message propagation.
Chung et al. [81] presented a leader election algorithm for a region of interest.
Nodes are assumed to be mobile and may fail, enter or exit the region of interest
at any time. The work requires the existence of certain communication paths in
the network to give a bound on the time for propagation of information within
the region. With the assumption that such paths exist to bound communication
delay between nodes, they show the correctness of their algorithm in electing a
unique leader for the region. It is however, not clear how the mobile nodes can
collaborate to form such a path if it doesn't already exist in the region.
Unlike most work presented above, our leader election involves electing a
leader for a region and nodes may be required to communicate using multihop
in the region. The closest work related to our leader election requirement is by
Chung et al. [81]. However, there are a number of dierences:
1. We only require node i 2 Nr to know whether it is a leader for region r.
If node i is not a leader for region r, it does not need to know who is the
leader for region r.
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2. Node is elected to be a leader based on the evaluation of information that it
has rather than some criteria such as node id. The information that a node
has may change over time (eg. when it sensed or receive new information),
this greatly diers from node id which is static.
3. Our leader election algorithm have to give an output at a xed deadline
(at the end of each monitoring period). It is not possible to guarantee that
a algorithm will output a unique leader at the deadline. In [81], their work
is focus on giving a unique leader, with no regards to time frame or any
deadline.
4.4.8 Security Issues in TADS
In this section, we briey discuss some security issues related to TADS. TADS
relies on advisory tokens to guide free taxis to regions with more demand. Since
every taxi can claim to be a leader taxi, this easily allows dishonest taxis to
generate advisory tokens to mislead other taxis. A dishonest taxi may want to
mislead other taxis to the wrong regions to increase its chances of picking up a
client.
A possible mitigation to this problem is to have a unique ID for each advisory
token generated by a taxi. The taxi is required to digitally sign the advisory
token. In addition, any records generated or received must also be digitally
signed. In the event of suspected dishonesty, the taxis can later come together
for verication. The taxi can be checked against under/over generation of advi-
sory tokens given the records that it has received. While this doesn't solve the
problem online, the verication will serve as deterrence for dishonesty or mali-
cious behavior. Other possible solutions include reputation schemes [82] [83] to
mitigate the problem.
Note that it is out of the scope of this thesis to give a detailed solution for
the security issues of TADS.
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4.5 Conclusion
We have extended the role of nodes in the DTN to include completing application-
related task in the system. Using the taxi scenario as a real life specic example,
we provide a solution by proposing the Taxi Advisory Dispatch System (TADS).
Unlike a taxi booking system that improves the service for call booking clients,
TADS improves the service for \ag down" clients. Through simulation results,
we showed that TADS is particularly useful for reducing long waiting times of
clients. In addition, for regions with sudden inux of client request, TADS also
perform very well in reducing the client waiting times.
Chapter 5
Robustness of Routing in DTN
The sucessful and ecient operation of a DTN involves cooperation among nodes
in the network. Nodes in the network contribute but may also consume some
resources (such as buer space) in the network. Unfortunately, like any other
network, malicious nodes may join and attack the network.
Early work on securing DTN largely depends on using public key cryptogra-
phy to limit participants to a set of authorized nodes and using class of service
for buer space and link capacity allocation [17] [49] [50] [51]. In addition, pack-
ets injected into the network are authenticated at every intermediate hops. Such
approaches incur considerable overhead and have to deal with the diculty of
key management in DTNs where communication delay may be long.
Due to diculty of key management in DTN, some authors have looked into
the possibility of forgoing authentication [1] [7]. Burgess et al. [1] study the ro-
bustness of DTN routing in the absence of authentication. They evaluated both
forward-based and replication-based routing protocols using trace-based evalua-
tion. A set of actions that are fundamental to any attacks in their model were
investigated: dropping packets, route falsication, ooding packets and coun-
terfeiting delivery acknowledgements. Their trace-based study suggests that
some DTNs coupled with replication-based routing protocols are intrinsically
fault tolerant, and robust even against a large number of attackers. This poses
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the question on the necessity of authentication or the level of authentication
required especially since authentication imposes overhead. Without authenti-
cation, it may encourage more nodes to join the network due to simplicity of
joining. Having more nodes in the DTN provide more contact capacity and
buer resources for the network.
While Burgess et al. work suggest that some DTNs coupled with replication-
based routing protocols are robust even against a large number of attackers, it
remains unclear on why the protocols are robust or the kind of scenarios whereby
the DTNs will be robust against the attackers. Nevertheless, Burgess's work has
gained a number of citations in the research community. At the time of writing
this thesis, their paper [1] has been cited over 60 times according to Google
Scholar. We believe that having a better understanding on the robustness of
DTN routing is important. In addition, we are also interested to know the
security implications when application-aware routing protocols are employed in
the DTN.
We revisit the Haggle and DieselNet DTNs that Burgess et al. have previ-
ously reported to be both robust against even a large number of attackers in
the network. First, we note that while Burgess et al. have evaluated several
attacks on the two DTNs, other variants of attacks are still possible. In this
work, we devised a ooding attack called the Non-Deliverable Packet Flooding
attack. Our non-deliverable packet ooding attack exploits metadata such as
contact history to improve its ooding eectiveness. In addition, we present an-
other attack called Identity Impersonation attack that causes relay and source
nodes to drop packets that have not been delivered.
We observe that minimum hop count for packet delivery has a strong inu-
ence on the robustness of the DTN routing protocols. Generally, attacks become
increasingly eective when the minimum hop count required increases. An ob-
servation we make in this work is that the small number of hops needed to deliver
a packet in some DTNs (Haggle and DieselNet) is one of the reasons why they
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are robust against the evaluated routing attacks.
In addition, we note that the increased eectiveness of non-deliverable packet
ooding attack comes from the exploitation of routing metadata. Routing meta-
data such as the contact histories are ooded into the network so that relay
nodes can make better decision in replicating/buering packets. Given that
our application-aware routing protocols also ood routing metadata (eg. depen-
dency graphs) into the network, attackers can similarly exploit them to increase
eectiveness in their attacks.
In the following sections, we rst describe our system model followed by a
description and evaluation on attacks in DTN routing. Next, we extend the
attacks to exploit application-aware routing protocols. Specically, we extend
MaxProp routing protocol to become application-aware and show how attackers
can exploit dependency graphs in their attack.
Our work suggests that for routing protocols which utilize routing metadata
to improve routing performance, it is important to validate the contents of their
control messages as attackers may be able to exploit such metadata to improve
the eectiveness of their attacks. In addition, due to the replicative nature of
replication-based routing protocols, it will be useful to employ rate limiting on
the number of tasks/packets that each node can inject into the network.
5.1 System Model
In this section, we describe the security assumptions, mobility models used and
properties of the routing protocol evaluated.
5.1.1 Security Assumptions
We assume that nodes do not perform authentication of relay nodes in the net-
work. Similarly, no authentication is performed on the authenticity of messages.
As a result, attackers can spoof their MAC layer addresses to appear to be
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any node, including destinations of packets. Routing metadata and packets can
also be spoofed and relay nodes have no means to verify their authenticity. We
do, however, assume that end-to-end communicating parties may have keying
materials that provide them with condentiality, integrity and authenticity.
Finally, we also assume that attackers do not have global knowledge of
DTN topology and future transfer opportunities. Stronger attackers with global
knowledge and choice of location will be able to inict much more damage than
our attacker model here. However, we show that even with a weaker attacker
model, attackers can still degrade the performance of the network considerably
such that we need to be wary about DTN without authentication.
5.1.2 Mobility Models
Our evaluation is based on real network traces, namely the DieselNet [9] and
Haggle project [84] traces which are similarly used in [1]. The Haggle trace
consists of a 3 days long trace that is based on a human mobility experiment in
Infocomm 2005. A total of 41 volunteers joined the experiment and each were
given an iMote device that can communicate with one another using Bluetooth.
The iMotes are also capable of connecting to other Bluetooth-capable devices in
the environment. Similar to the experiment in [1], we removed connection events
from the Haggle data that lasted less than one second or involved the singular
appearance of a node since meaningful data transfer is likely to require setup time
and nodes incapable of routing data may be ignored. After the transformation,
the traces are left with events involving 41 Class 1 devices (the iMotes devices)
and none of the Class 2 devices (other Bluetooth-capable devices). In order to
limit a single simulation interval to be 24 hours or less, we split the Haggle trace
into 3 segments, each lasting about 1 day.
The DieselNet trace comprises of roughly 30 buses (with specic number
varying according to the bus schedule). The median number of DieselNet buses
in each trace is 19. Buses are outtted with wireless transmitters and receivers.
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Communications between the buses are done via the 802.11b protocol. DieselNet







































Figure 5.1: Unique Peers Connected Daily
Figure 5.1 shows the number of peers encountered per mobile node for the
two traces. Nodes in the Haggle traces have a broader distribution of the number
of peers encountered. The median number of peers contacted by each node in
the Haggle trace is 19, about 45% of the network. The median number of peers
contacted by each node in DieselNet is 7, about 39% of the median number of
buses in each trace.
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5.1.3 Routing Protocol
The routing protocol used in our evaluation is MaxProp [9], a replication-based
DTN routing protocol. MaxProp has been shown to provide robustness against
various attacks [1]. It oers better throughput than several other strategies such
as Epidemic [25], Prophet [8], Spray and Wait [26] and even Dijkstra algorithm
with an oracle of future transfer opportunities [20].
While we use MaxProp in our study, our study is applicable to other replication-
based routing protocols that use ooded routing metadata to guide replication
and buer management.
In terms of packet scheduling/replication, MaxProp replicates packets in the
following order:
1. Packets destined to the contacted node
2. Routing metadata (estimations of the probability of meeting every other
node)
3. Acknowledgements of delivered data.
4. Packets in ascending order of hop count for hop count below a certain
threshold. This threshold is adaptive and is determined by using the av-
erage contact capacity measured from previous encounters.
5. Packets in descending order of delivery likelihood.
In terms of buer management, MaxProp removes packets from its buer in
the following order:
1. Acknowledged packets.
2. Packets in ascending order of delivery likelihood for packets with hop count
above a certain adaptive threshold.
3. Packets in descending order of packet hop count.
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MaxProp uses network-wide acknowledgements to remove delivered packets
from relay or source nodes, clearing up buer and also prevent nodes from receiv-
ing packets that have already been delivered. An acknowledgement is created
whenever a packet rst reaches its destination. The acknowledgement is then
ooded to all other nodes in the network.
As mentioned by Burgess et al. [1], to defend against acknowledgement coun-
terfeiting, a node should ignore an acknowledgement if it has not seen the packet
being acknowledged beforehand. In all our experiments, we implement this de-
fense against acknowledgement counterfeiting.
In MaxProp and many similar DTN routing protocols [8{10, 32], routing
metadata is kept and exchanged when two peers meet. Each node maintain a
copy of its own table that describes the node contacts that it has observed in the
past. Each contact history has an associated timestamp, indicating the time in
which the direct contact occurs. These contact information or routing metadata
will be replicated to other nodes during contact so that other nodes are aware
of each others' contact history. When two nodes in the contact have dierent
versions of the routing metadata entry, the copy with the earlier timestamp will
be replaced. Figure 5.2 shows an example of MaxProp routing metadata that is
stored at node A.
Based on the routing metadata exchanged, the data maintained in each con-
tact table is used to estimate delivery likelihood. In the case of MaxProp,
this likelihood is computed in the form of path cost. The higher the deliv-
ery likelihood, the lower the path cost. The cost of the path i; i + 1; :::; d is
the sum of the probabilities that each connection on the path does not occur:




1   fxx+1. In gure 5.2, the most likely path for de-
livering a packet from A to D is through node B, since the path cost ABD has
the minimum value. The cost is computed as ABD=0.3 ( (1 - 0.9) + (1 - 0.8) ).
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Figure 5.2: The organization of routing metadata in a node
5.2 Attack Model
In [1], four general attacks Drop All, Random ooding, Invert routing metadata,
and Acknowledgement counterfeiting were experimentally shown to be ineec-
tive. We briey describe some of the factors that may limit the eectiveness of
these attacks.
Drop All attack is not eective as there are still many possible paths to the
packet's destination that does not involve the attackers.
In Random ooding attack, attackers randomly choose a known destination
and ood packets to the chosen destination. The priority to replicate or drop
the attackers' packets is on the same level as the non-attackers' packets. Hence
the eectiveness of Random Flooding attack is limited by how fast the attackers
can inject packets into the network to cause resource contention.
For Invert routing metadata attack, attackers invert the metadata of the
probability of meeting other nodes. The goal is to cause the list of packets to be
transmitted or dropped in the reverse order. Its eectiveness is limited by how
resource constrained the network is. For example, if two peers meet and they
have enough contact capacity to transmit all their buer contents to the other
node, then even if the list of packets are transferred in the reverse order, there
is no performance degradation at all. Perhaps a more severe limitation of invert
routing metadata attack is that inverting the routing metadata even number of
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times will give the correct version of the routing metadata. For example, if an
attacker sees the same routing metadata the second time, inverting it the second
time gives correct version of the routing metadata.
In Acknowledgement counterfeiting, attackers send out falsied acknowledge-
ments of known and yet to be delivered packets in the network. To counterfeit
acknowledgement of a packet in the network, attackers must rst know the ex-
istence of the packet in the network.
While the above attacks may be ineective, many variations of these attacks
are still possible. Furthermore, these attacks can be combined to reinforce one
another.
5.2.1 Proposed Attack
Our proposed attack combines and uses a variation of the attacks in the previous
section in an attempt to overcome the described limitations. It consists of two
components. The rst component, called non-deliverable packet ooding oods
data to non-existent nodes to cause resource contention. It also includes routing
metadata falsication that spoof routing metadata so that the ooded packets
gets higher priority in replication and lower priority in being dropped. The
second component, identity impersonation, impersonates dierent identities to
act as destinations for packets. In addition, upon knowing the existence of
a packet, attackers ood network-wide acknowledgements of the packet in an
attempt to purge the packet out of the network.
The primary purpose of the rst component is to cause network congestion,
and to make relay nodes having a higher tendency to replicate attackers' packets
and drop non-attackers' packets from their buer. The objective of the second
component is to purge packets from both the source and the relay nodes. We
explain in detail the two components in the following sections.
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Non-Deliverable Packet Flooding
In Non-Deliverable Packet Flooding attack, attacker oods new packets to some
non-existent destinations so that the ooded packets will not be delivered and
stay in the network until expiry. However, with MaxProp or other routing pro-
tocols that rely on contact histories to estimate delivery time or probability,
non-deliverable packets are actually given the lowest priority. Hence ooded
packets are replicated last and dropped rst. This is undesirable from the at-
tacker's point of view. To counter that, attackers can perform routing metadata
falsication by spoong every node's routing metadata and claim that the node
can reach the non-existent destination with high probability. More specically
in our experiments, the attacker removes all entries in a routing metadata table
and creates an entry with meeting probability 1 to the non-existent destination.
Figure 5.3 shows node A's routing metadata with and without routing meta-
data attack. Node E is a non-existent destination and attackers ood packets
to node E. With routing metadata attack, node A will give replication priority
for packets in the order B, E, D, C. Further, if there is contention for buer,
packets destined to C will be dropped rst. Without routing metadata attack,
node A will give replication priority for packets in the order B, D, C, E and if
there is contention for buer, packets destined to E will be dropped rst. This
illustrates that routing metadata attack can successfully raise the priority of the
attackers' ooded packets.
Eectiveness of metadata falsication
Let NA be the number of attackers in the system. Consider an attack where
NA attackers keep injecting false routing information of a victim node, say node
D. Let's call a node who is neither an attacker nor the victim a carrier node.
Whenever an attacker meets a carrier node, it will send a tainted table (see gure
5.3 for example) of node D, which contains false information and time-stamped
with the latest time. On the other hand, the victim also injects the correct table
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(a) Under Attack
(b) Without Attack
Figure 5.3: Comparison of node's routing metadata with/without attack.
to the carrier nodes. Recall that whenever two nodes meet, they will exchange
and update their routing metadata to the one with the later timestamp. Note
that only the attackers and victim will set the timestamp, carrier nodes simply
help replicate the routing metadata without modifying the timestamp.
Now, under the above spreading process, we want to determine the fraction of
carrier nodes having the tainted table. We claim that the fraction is NA=(NA +
1) under reasonable assumptions. Let us consider this mobility model: The
time is divided into periods of unit length. During each period, two randomly
chosen nodes come into contact. The random nodes chosen in each period are
independent to choices made in other periods. Let Xt;i be the random variable
where Xt;i = 1 if the node i's metadata is tainted at time t, and 0 otherwise.
For convenience1, let us assume that initially (i.e. at time 0), each node has the
1This assumption on the initial condition is not crucial. One may consider the initial con-
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probability of NA=(NA+1) being tainted (i.e. Prob(X0;i = 1) = NA=(NA+1)).





From (5.1) and linearity of expectations, the fraction of carrier nodes having
a tainted table over all carrier nodes is also NA=NA + 1. To show (5.1), let us
consider a carrier node whose routing metadata originates from a malicious node
or the victim, and trace back how the routing metadata spread from the source.
We say that there is a path from node p0 at time t0 to node p1 at time t1, if
there is a sequence
j1 = p0; s1 = t0; j2; s2; j3; : : : ; jk 1; sk 1 = t1; jk = p1;
where node ji and ji+1 meet during time period si, and the subsequence s1; s2; : : :,
is strictly increasing. Let us take (t1   t0) as the length of the path. Note that
if there is a path from node p0 to the victim, and it is shorter than every path
to a malicious node, then the metadata in p0 will not be tainted. Similarly, if
there is a path to a malicious node, and every path to the victim is longer, then
the metadata will be tainted. In other words, whether the metadata is tainted
or not depends on whether the nearest node is the victim or a malicious node.
Due to the independencies in choosing the two nodes in each time period, the
probability that the nearest node is malicious is NA=(NA + 1).
To know the eectiveness of routing metadata falsication in the Haggle and
DieselNet traces, we perform simulations on them to get the fraction of nodes
having a tainted routing metadata. Each simulation was run till the end of the
trace and the fraction of nodes having a tainted routing metadata is noted. The
result presented here is the average of the dierent runs of the simulation. The
dition where all metadata are untainted. In this case, the fraction approaches NA=(NA + 1),
instead of the equality we obtained in (1).
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description of these traces and simulations can be found in section 5.1.2. Figure
5.4 shows that the traces in our simulation exhibit similar fraction of tainted
























Figure 5.4: Fraction of nodes with tainted routing metadata
The result in gure 5.4 suggests that it is possible for very few attackers
to launch an eective routing metadata falsication attack. This applies even
for large networks with hundreds or thousands of nodes. Hence, we expect our
non-deliverable packet ooding attack to benet much from the use of routing
metadata falsication.
Identity Impersonation Attack
In the identity impersonation attack, attackers impersonate dierent identities
to act as destinations for packets so as to trick relay nodes or the packets' source
node to believe that the packets have been delivered. Furthermore, upon knowing
the existence of a packet, attackers ood network-wide acknowledgements of the
packet into the network. Nodes that are tricked into believing that the packets
have been delivered will drop the packets from their buer.
Such attack directly exploits the lack of node authentication. In a single con-
tact, an attacker can potentially take on the identities of many other nodes if the
contact duration is suciently long. In the extreme case, all packets in a node's
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buer can be falsely removed. This is possible since frequent disconnections are
the norms in DTN. This attack is most eective when the attacker encounters
the source early in the packet forwarding process when the number of replicas
of a packet in the network is low.
5.3 Evaluation
We evaluate the robustness of DTNs in the presence of attackers launching ran-
dom ooding attacks (rf ), non-deliverable packet ooding attacks (ndp), and
identity impersonation attack (imp). For identity impersonation attack, we limit
the switching of identity to at most once per second. All our evaluations were
performed using our simulator that was modied from the ONE simulator [85],
a simulator developed specically for DTN simulations.
The traces used for simulation are the Haggle and DieselNet trace (see section
5.1.2 for description). In our simulation, we randomly assign nodes as honest and
attacker nodes. All honest nodes generate trac destined for other randomly
chosen honest nodes. Each node have a 5MB buer size and packets may be
deleted before delivery when the buer is full. When a packet is to be dropped
due to buer full, a node will always drop packets originating from other nodes
before considering dropping its own packets. In all simulations, packets are xed
at size 10KB. Whenever load is too high, delivery rate is very low due to con-
tention. In order to isolate the eects of the attackers, we use a moderate packet
load of 10 packets/hr per honest node. Finally, in the identity impersonation
attack, we assume that a malicious node can take on a new identity only once
every second.
The transfer capacity of a single contact has an impact on the routing per-
formance. In the Haggle trace, only contact duration is provided. If we assume
the bluetooth device can transmit at 1Mbps, the median per-contact capacity
will be approximately 25MB. In all our evaluations, unless otherwise stated, we
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set the median per-contact capacity to be 25MB, including the DieselNet trace.
Figure 5.5 shows the CDF graph of the per-contact capacity for the Haggle and
DieselNet trace. In this setting, there is greater than 80% of the contact oppor-
tunities having enough capacity to transfer the full buer contents of the two
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Figure 5.5: CDF of contact capacity
5.3.1 Impact of Varying Number of Attackers
From gure 5.6-5.8, it can be seen that non-deliverable packet ooding is eective
even when there are only 1-2 attackers. In fact, the addition of more attackers
does not help to bring the delivery ratio much lower. The reason is that 1-2
attackers is enough to cause the relay nodes' buer to be lled with the attackers'
packets due to the replicative nature of MaxProp protocol and high per-contact
capacity. Further, since the packets are non-deliverable, they stay in the relay
nodes' buer for a long period of time, causing contention with other relay
packets. For random ooding, there is less buer contention since ooded packets
may be delivered to the destination quickly, and these are removed from the relay
nodes' buer much faster. Furthermore, unlike non-deliverable packet ooding
attack, random ooding attack does not manipulate the routing metadata to
give the attackers' packets higher priority to stay in the buer or be selected for
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replication. Note that in the simulation, nodes always keep packets originating
from itself. Hence even though relay packets are dropped, the source node still
holds a copy of the packet and can still deliver the message through direct contact




















































Figure 5.6: Delivery Ratio under buer contention
Figure 5.7 shows the hop count of messages at the time they were delivered
to their destinations with 10% attackers. It can be seen that without ooding
attacks, there are quite a number of packets delivered with 3-6 hop counts. On
the other hand, with ooding attacks, most packets tend to be delivered with
only 1 or 2 hop counts. The main reason is that ooding causes many packets
















































Figure 5.7: Message hop count at delivery (10% attackers)
to be dropped at relay nodes due to buer contention. Since in our simulation,
source always give higher priority in keeping its own packets, and due to mobility,
the source might later meet the destination of the packets and send the packets
to it directly. In other words, the capability of each node to eventually meet
many other nodes provides substantial robustness against ooding attacks that
causes packets to be dropped at relay nodes. Note however, the delivery latency
is aected by ooding attacks, causing much higher delivery latency as shown in
Figure 5.8.
Unlike non-deliverable packet ooding, impersonation attack is more eec-
tive when the number of attackers increases since launching the attacks require











































Figure 5.8: Delivery Latency (secs) under buer contention
direct contact. The more attackers there are in the network, the more per-
formance degradation it causes. Flooding attack and impersonation attack are
complementary and can be launched together to cause more damage, as can be
seen from gure 5.6.
5.3.2 Communicating Pairs Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the routing performance of peers who are communi-
cating across dierent distances (in terms of required hop counts). Our goal is
to understand how non-deliverable packet ooding and identity impersonation
attack aects communicating peers that communicates over dierent distances
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in terms of hop counts. We rst use a synthetic trace to better understand the
eects of the attacks followed by further evaluation on the Haggle and DieselNet
traces.
The synthetic trace imposes some structure so that it is possible to evaluate
peers communicating with dierent number of minimum hop counts required.
It consists of 40 nodes in a 5 by 5km area. The 40 nodes are divided into 8
dierent groups (each group consist of 5 nodes), and each node in a group move
around an attraction point in the map with a standard deviation of 500m. The
position of attraction points are randomly generated with the constraint that
no two attraction points are within 1000m to each other. We generate 10 such
synthetic traces for our simulation and the results reported are the averaged of
the 10 traces.
In our evaluation of attacks, we place one attacker in one of the groups, call
it group A. We want to evaluate the delivery ratio when an honest node in a
group sends packets to another honest node in a certain group.
We divide the communicating pairs into the following category:
1. A-A: packets sent from a node in group A to another node in group A
2. A-B: packets sent from a node in group A to another node in group B.
Group B's attraction point is at most 2000m from group A's attraction
point.
3. A-C: packets sent from a node in group A to another node in group C.
Group C's attraction point is at least 2000m away from group A's attrac-
tion point.
4. X-Y: packets sent from a node in group X to another node in group Y where
there is no attacker in group X and Y. In addition, group X's attraction
point is at least 2000m away from group Y's attraction point.
Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of hops taken when packets are delivered in
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each category when there are no attackers. Majority of the packets in category
A-A are delivered within 1-2 hops. For category A-C, C-A, X-Y and Y-X, the
communication is further apart with majority of the packets delivered after going



























Figure 5.9: Distribution of hops taken
Figure 5.10 shows the delivery ratio of nodes communicating in dierent
groups (recall that 1 attacker is placed in group A). When the number of hops
required is low (eg. A-A), non-deliverable packet ooding do not have any eect,
since eventually the source node may directly meet the destination. However,
when the number of hops required is high (eg. A-C), communications between
the two peers rely on relay nodes. Non-deliverable packet ooding causes relay
nodes along the path to drop packets, and communications in category A-C are
severely aected. The delivery ratio drops from 0.77 (without attacker) to 0.09
(one attacker). This demonstrates that for peers that require a few hops in
order to communicate, non-deliverable packet ooding attack can have a serious
impact on them.
Identity impersonation attack is more eective when the attacker is closer
to the source of a packet, giving higher chance that the attacker eliminates
the packet before it is replicated to many other nodes. This is especially clear
when comparing category A-C and C-A under identity impersonation attack.
CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS OF ROUTING IN DTN 103
Delivery ratio for category A-C is only 0.11 compared to 0.46 for group C-A
communication.
For group X-Y and Y-X communication, eectiveness of non-delivery packet
ooding depends on the location of the attacker. If attacker is far from the
communication path of X-Y and Y-X, then it may fail to eectively taint the relay
nodes routing metadata. In such cases, relay nodes will then drop the attacker's
ooded packets when there is buer contention. Identity impersonation attack
also does not work well in such cases since by the time the attacker learns about
the existence of a packet and try to ood counterfeit acknowledgements into the
network, the packet may have already been delivered or replicated many times




















Figure 5.10: Communicating pairs evaluation (1 attacker in Group A)
We now move on to study the impact of such attacks using the Haggle and
DieselNet traces. Figure 5.11 shows the delivery ratio based on the minimum
hop count required for a packet to be delivered to the destination. We did not
show the results for minimum hop count that is greater than 3 as the number of
these packets are too little. Similar to what we observed in the synthetic trace,
packets with high minimum hop count required for delivery are severely aected
by non-deliverable packet ooding attack. Packets with minimum hop count of
1 for delivery are not aected by non-deliverable packet ooding attack, but it
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Figure 5.11: Delivery Ratio with dierent minimum hop count for delivery (10%
attackers)
5.3.3 Study Impacts of Varying Buer Sizes
We investigate whether increasing buer size makes MaxProp more robust against
non-deliverable packet ooding attack. Figure 5.12 shows that increasing buer
size does not help in making MaxProp more robust against non-deliverable
packet ooding attack. Even with additional buer, the attackers' packets
quickly lled up the buer, causing similar level of resource contention.





































Figure 5.12: Delivery Ratio varying buer size
5.4 Attacks on Application-Aware Routing
We have seen that the increased eectiveness of our attacks comes from the
exploitation of routing metadata. Routing metadata such as the contact his-
tory are ooded into the network so that relay nodes can make better decision
in replicating/buering packets. Given that our application-aware routing pro-
tocols also ood routing metadata (eg. dependency graphs) into the network,
attackers can similarly exploit them to increase eectiveness in their attacks. In
the following sections, we rst extend MaxProp into an application-aware proto-
col. Next we show how attackers can exploit the application-aware dependency
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graphs to increase eectiveness in their attacks.
5.4.1 Application-Aware MaxProp
Extending MaxProp to be application-aware requires us to change the cost com-
putation for MaxProp routing. Figure 5.3 shows an example of how MaxProp
computes cost to various destinations. This is done without regards to how likely
the packets can help to complete the application task.
Similar to DSAR, we dene task contribution for a task as the ratio of un-
delivered data blocks of the task in the node's buer over the total number of
(estimated) undelivered blocks of the task. The value of task contribution cap-
tures the utility of a set of data blocks for task completion (see section 3.2.3).
The undelivered blocks of the task can be estimated easily due to the use of
network wide acknowledgements in MaxProp.
In the Application-Aware MaxProp (A-MaxProp), nodes give higher priority
to tasks (and their associated data blocks) that have higher chances of completion
and delivery. Let the task contribution value of a task t be TC(t). To deliver
the task however comes with a path cost c(t), which is the cost of the path
from current node in consideration to task t's destination. (See section 5.1.3
on the computation of path cost in MaxProp). In A-MaxProp, we dene the
dene the utility value of a data block i to be the sum of all its associated task's








where T is the set of tasks that data block i is associated with.
U(i) is a utility function that takes into consideration on both the prospect
of completing a task, and the cost of delivering the packet. Replication are
performed rst for data blocks having a larger utility value.
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5.4.2 Application-Aware Attack
In this section, we show how ooding and acknowledgement counterfeiting can
be extended to attack application-aware routing protocols.
Attackers can improve the eectiveness of ooding attack in application-
aware protocols by making each attacker's ooding packet appear as if it con-
tributes a lot to the completion of a task. A simple way to increase the eec-
tiveness of ooding attack in A-MaxProp is to simply ood the network with
many tasks that consist of one data block. From the relay node's point of view,
this data block will have a task contribution factor of 1 since delivering this data
block will be equivalent to completing a task in the network. This gives the
attackers' ooding packets higher priority compared to others that may have a
smaller task contribution factor.
To extend identity impersonation to attack application-aware routing proto-
cols, an attacker can choose to counterfeit acknowledgements for only one data
block in each task. The idea is to prevent the task from completing, yet allow
other data blocks of the task to continue to consume resources in the network.
We will evaluate the eectiveness of these two variants of application-aware
attacks in the following sections.
5.5 Evaluating Application-Aware Attacks
We evaluate the application-aware attacks using application-aware random ood-
ing attacks (arf ), application-aware non-deliverable packet ooding attacks (andp),
and application-aware identity impersonation attack (aimp). These attacks are
compared to their respective non-application-aware counterparts in the evalua-
tion.
We use the same Haggle and DieselNet trace as in the previous sections.
Each node has a 5MB buer size and packets may be deleted before delivery
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when the buer is full. When a packet is to be dropped due to buer full, a
node will always drop packets originating from other nodes before considering
dropping its own packets.
We use le transfer as the application in the evaluation (ie. all data blocks
of the le must be transferred for the task to be considered as complete). All
honest nodes generate a le every hour that is destined for other randomly chosen
honest nodes. The number of data blocks for each generated le is randomly
chosen to be in the range of [1,20] data blocks.
In arf and andp, attackers create many tasks with only one data block per
task and ood them into the network. In the non-application-aware ooding
(rf and ndp), attackers create many tasks with task size randomly chosen from
the range of [1,20]. In addition, note that for arf and rf, the packets' destina-
tions are randomly chosen among the honest nodes while for andp and ndp, the
destinations are non-existent nodes.
In aimp, attackers counterfeit acknowledgements for the rst data block of
each task. In the non-application-aware identity impersonation attack (imp),
attackers counterfeit acknowledgements for all data blocks of each task.
The metrics for evaluation are Task Completion Ratio (TCR) and Block
Delivery Ratio (BDR) (dened in section 3.3).
Figure 5.13 shows the results comparing the various ooding attacks on A-
MaxProp. It can be seen that application-aware ooding attacks improve the
eectiveness of both random and non-deliverable packet ooding attacks. The
reason is that relay nodes tend to give data blocks from small tasks higher
priority since delivering such data blocks is equivalent to completing tasks in the
network.
When there are two attackers in the Haggle network, the TCR is 0.66 for rf
and 0.53 for its application-aware counterpart (arf ). For ndp, TCR is 0.46 and
0.42 for its application-aware counterpart (ndp).
Figure 5.14 shows the result comparing the various identity impersonation





















































































































Figure 5.13: Application-Aware Flooding
attacks on A-MaxProp. For application-aware identity impersonation attack
(aimp), attackers only counterfeit acknowledgement for 1 data block per task.
As a result, the BDR remains high compared to its non-application-aware coun-
terparts (imp). For instance, when there are 5 attackers in the DieselNet, the
BDR for aimp is 0.71 and the BDR for imp is only 0.40. This possibly makes
aimp a more stealthy attack compared to imp.
The goal of aimp is to reduce the TCR, which it is able to do so eectively as
shown in the gure 5.14. Note that aimp is however, still less eective compared
to the non-application-aware imp. When there are 5 attackers in the DieselNet,
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the TCR for aimp is 0.47 and 0.39 for imp. The reason is as long as there is one














































































































Figure 5.14: Application-Aware Identity Impersonation
Finally, we combine the ooding and identity impersonation attacks and
evaluate their eectiveness.
Figure 5.15 shows the result comparing the various combinations of attacks
on A-MaxProp. The most eective combination of attacks is andp+imp. In
this attack, attackers can remove many honest nodes' packets through identity
impersonation and oods many non-deliverable packets to the honest nodes. In





















































































































Figure 5.15: Combining Application-Aware Attacks
andp+aimp, the ooding is not as successful since there are more honest nodes'
packets (due to aimp minimally counterfeiting acknowledgements) to contend
with the attackers' ooding packets.
5.6 Discussion
Previous sections discussed the attacks without any routing authentication. What
if some form of authentication can be performed? We consider two levels of au-
thentication here:
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1. Authenticate the identity of the peer in an encounter
2. Authenticate the identity of the peer in an encounter, routing metadata
and acknowledgements
In (1), nodes in the network authenticate the peer when there is an encounter.
Nodes can easily authenticate each other based on public key in a certicate.
Overhead is low but in this case, it only prevent against identity impersonation
(partially). The attacker will not be able to impersonate as the destination of
packets, but it will still be able to ood fake acknowledgements. Note that non-
deliverable packet ooding attack is not aected by such authentication at all.
As such, authentication at this level is not eective against our attacks.
In (2), besides authenticating the identity of the peer, it also authenticates
the routing metadata and acknowledgements. For acknowledgements, they are
signed by the destination node. The overhead involved is much higher compared
to (1), but it can fully prevent identity impersonation. As for non-deliverable
packet ooding attack, ooding to non-existent destination is still possible. How-
ever, the metadata falsication component is thwarted. Hence, non-deliverable
packets will be correctly determined by relay nodes that it is unlikely to be de-
livered. In this case, the relays may choose to drop these packets in the event of
buer contention. As a result, non-deliverable packet ooding will not be eec-
tive. It should be noted however, tailgating can be launch with non-deliverable
packet ooding attacks. The attacker can tailgate the target destination node
for a sucient period of time. This allows non-deliverable packets to be seen
as more deliverable by relay nodes. The eectiveness of non-deliverable packet
ooding is hence improved. For solutions to attacks with tailgating, reader is
referred to the paper [86].
In addition, one should note that both levels of authentications alone can-
not prevent application-aware ooding attacks. The main problem with our
application-aware routing protocols is that it allows the node itself to use depen-
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dency graphs to specify the importance of its packets in completing a task. This
makes it impossible to know if the node is lying or cheating. A possible way to
prevent resource misuse here is to perform admission control to limit the rate of
task injection for each node in the network [87] [88] [89].
5.7 Conclusion
Routing metadata such as contact history, acknowledgements, dependency graphs
and etc. that are employed in DTN routing to improve resource management can
similarly be exploited by attackers to improve the eectiveness of attacks. We
have presented two attacks - non-deliverable ooding and identity impersonation
attacks that - that demonstrates how attackers can exploit routing metadata to
improve the eectiveness of attacks.
Using non-deliverable ooding and identity impersonation attack, we evalu-
ated MaxProp routing on Haggle and DieselNet which has earlier been thought
to be robust against even a large number of attackers. We observe that the
small number of hops needed to deliver a packet is one of the main reasons why
they are more robust against routing attacks. Nevertheless, our non-deliverable
ooding and identity impersonation attacks can still degrade the routing per-
formance of Haggle and DieselNet considerably. The increased eectiveness of
our attack mainly comes from the exploitation of routing metadata such as the
contact history used in MaxProp.
Due to the fact that our proposed application-aware routing protocols send
out dependency graphs as routing metadata, attackers can similarly exploit them
to enhance their attacks. To demonstrate the attack, we extended MaxProp
to application-aware (A-MaxProp), and show how attackers can modify non-
deliverable ooding and identity impersonation to attack A-MaxProp.
Our work demonstrates the importance of authenticating routing metadata
that may potentially be exploited by attackers to create highly eective attacks.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
Unlike traditional networks, DTNs are characterized by intermittent connec-
tivity. Nodes may experience frequent disconnections and long communication
delay in DTNs. While there are existing works that focus on improving the
performance of DTN, they do not look into how it may benet or improve the
applications running on the DTN. With the unique characteristic of DTN, we
believe that it is benecial to the applications if the DTN are application-aware.
In our rst work, we have shown that in the face of inherent intermittent con-
nectivity, knowledge of application semantics or requirements can be exploited
in routing to improve application performance in the network. We proposed a
mechanism to capture application semantics into dependency relationships. The
mechanism is general and can be used to model a large class of applications.
Finally, we showed how to incorporate dependency relationships into existing
DTNs routing algorithms to enhance application performance.
In our second work, we looked into a class of applications in which nodes in
the DTN participate in completing application-related tasks in the system. We
looked at a possible real life taxi scenario that falls into the described class of
applications and proposed the Taxi Advisory Dispatch System (TADS). TADS
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is a distributed system in which taxis collaboratively estimate the number of free
taxis and clients in each region. Due to communication uncertainty in DTNs,
instead of having all nearby taxis agreeing upon the region they should move to
next, we proposed to use a leader approach in which a taxi is chosen to be the
representative leader node for a region based on some criteria after some time of
monitoring. If a region requires more free taxi, then the leader for that region
sends out an appropriate number of advisory tokens to request for free taxis to
move into the region. We evaluated TADS using real-life taxi traces that consist
of over 15,000 taxis. Our evaluation results showed that TADS can reduce the
number of clients with wait times longer than 60 minutes by over 30%.
Lastly, we studied attacks that aect the resource usage in the DTN. We
revisited the Haggle and DieselNet DTNs that Burgess et al. [1] have previously
reported that both the DTNs (with no authentication mechanisms) are robust
against even a large number of attackers. We showed how techniques that are
employed by many routing protocols to improve resource usage can similarly be
exploited by attackers. Specically, we showed how routing metadata such as
contact history and acknowledgements can be exploited to improve the eective-
ness of attacks and we identied the scenarios where DTNs are most vulnerable to
such attacks. In addition, we showed how attackers can increase the eectiveness
of attack in our application-aware routing protocols through the manipulation of
dependency graphs. Finally, we gave a discussion on the level of authentication
that is required to secure the attacks that we presented.
6.2 Future Work
In our current work, we have proposed a mechanism to capture application se-
mantics based on dependency relationships. Future work can improve on the
mechanism to capture more kinds of application semantics. For example, our
current dependency graph does not capture \exclusion" relationship. Consider
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an application such that the existence of some data blocks invalidates the use-
fulness of some other data blocks. In this case, relay nodes upon knowing the
existence of the data blocks can drop those data blocks that are now considered
as useless.
Another interesting area of research is on routing protocols with limited
copies of replication. We have worked on protocols that are epidemic in nature
(eg. MaxProp, SAR, DSAR), but there are other protocols that limit the num-
ber of replication allowed (such as Spray and Wait). We believe that for large
network with many nodes, protocols that are purely epidemic in nature may be
faced with severe resource constraints as each relay node may now be tasked to
buer replicate copies of data from many nodes in the network. Hence, it makes
sense to limit the copies of replication for such large network. It is interesting
to design application-aware routing protocols with adaptive limit on the copies
of replication.
Limited copies of replication may require a smarter routing algorithm to
improve delivery. However, a smarter routing algorithm may also be easier to
be exploited by attackers. In addition, the robustness or fault tolerance of the
routing algorithm is lower with limited copies of replication. For example, if
every message can have only one replica, then dropping attack will be successful
if the attackers manage to drop both the message. Researching into this area
will be interesting.
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